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ABSTRACT
Labor arbitrators do not have a common profes­
sional background, either educationally or experientially. 
This research examines differences in education, age, and 
experience in terms of the effect on values and attitudes 
of labor arbitrators. A primary research project was 
undertaken to test several specific hypotheses derived 
from the following general statement.
The attitudes of professional labor 
arbitrators toward certain cognitive 
objects (things, people, ideas, etc.) 
significantly related to occupational 
roles are in part a function of their 
education, age, and experience.
The data used to test the specific hypotheses 
were gathered by sending 400 questionnaires (43 percent 
usable response) to professional labor arbitrators. Each 
of the respondent arbitrators completed a semantic differ­
ential test of eight industrial relations-oriented concepts. 
The questionnaire included questions designed to gather 
detailed information on education, age, and experience.
The data were analyzed for differences at the .05 level of 
statistical significance through the analysis of variance 
technique.
Three hypotheses were tested concerning education. 
For this purpose the respondent arbitrators were classified
xii
according to academic degree: Law, Economics, and Other.
The responses of lawyer-arbitrators and economist- 
arbitrators were found to be different over a substan­
tial portion of the semantic differential data. It was 
concluded that the attitudes of lawyer-arbitrators and 
economist-arbitrators, as reflected by the semantic dif­
ferential test, are different.
The responses of lawyer-arbitrators and "other"- 
arbitrators were concluded to be not different.
The responses of economist-arbitrators and 
"other”-arbitrators were found to be different over a 
substantial portion of the semantic differential data.
It was concluded that the attitudes of these two groups, 
as reflected by the semantic differential test, are 
different.
The general conclusion concerning education is 
that the different educational backgrounds of labor arbi­
trators are responsible for the significant differences 
in attitudes as reflected by the semantic differential test.
No relationship was found to exist between age 
differences and the attitudes of the respondent arbitrators, 
as reflected by the semantic differential test.
Eight hypotheses were tested concerning experi­
ence, as divided into "direct arbitration" experience and 
"non-arbitration" experience. Three of the eight hypotheses
xiii
concerned direct arbitration experience as determined byr 
(1 ) years as a labor arbitrator, (2) number of labor 
arbitration decisions rendered, and (3) whether the arbi­
trator considered himself as devoting full time or part 
time to arbitration activities. Each of the three hypoth­
eses concerning direct labor-arbitration experience was 
concluded to be not different.
The remaining five hypotheses were concerned 
with "non-arbitration" experience as determined by,
(1) federal employment experience with an agency concerned 
with the labor sector (NLRB, WLB, etc.), (2) management 
experience with a firm, (3) labor union membership experi­
ence, (4) geographic residence, and (5) NAA membership.
Based on an analysis of federal employment 
experience, it was concluded that the attitudes of those 
labor arbitrators with such experience were different from 
those without federal employment experience. The hypoth­
esis was accepted.
An analysis of managerial experience concluded 
that the attitudes of those labor arbitrators with such 
experience were different from those without managerial 
experience. The hypothesis was accepted.
An analysis of laibor union membership experience, 
geographic residence, and NAA membership yielded no dif­
ferences in the attitudes of respondent arbitrators.
xiv
In summary, education was determined to influence 
the attitudes of labor arbitrator is as reflected by the 
semantic differential test. Age had no significant influ­
ence on attitudes. Direct arbitration experience had no 
significant influence on the attitudes of labor arbitra­
tors, but non-arbitration experience did influence the 




INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Statement of the Problem 
Passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 
1935 marked a break with a work system under which, tradi­
tionally, management's obligations to its employees were 
either self-assumed or imposed by the competitive labor 
market. Since that time national labor policy has supported 
the concept of collective bargaining, which is the process 
whereby management and union agree on the terms (wages, 
hours, and working conditions) under which workers shall 
perform their duties. The union-management contract speci­
fies terms of agreement and sets forth the reciprocal re­
sponsibilities and obligations of each party. Collective 
bargaining has resulted in more stable labor relations and 
an expansion of industrial peace for the United States 
economy.
Under collective bargaining, employers and em­
ployees jointly agree upon certain specified conditions of 
employment which are incorporated in a collective bargain­
ing contract. Striking a bargain does not, however, exhaust 
all possibilities for disagreement. In fact, contract vio­
lations, contract meaning, and contract application are 
additional sources of future disputes. In recognition of
these latent threats to harmonious relations the great 
majority of labor contracts contain provisions for amicable 
settlement of contract-relate.d disputes in the form of 
grievance procedures. Usually terminating the grievance 
procedure is arbitration, which is the topic of concern to 
this study.
Arbitration as Part of the Grievance Procedure
"The essence of a grievance is a charge that the
union-management contract has been violated."'*' A specified
procedure for resolving such grievances is present in 99
percent of all major collective bargaining agreements in
2the United States. Arbitration of a grievance is the 
final step of the grievance procedure which normally car­
ries the unresolved dispute through successively higher 
levels of union and management interaction in a series of 
joint attempts to resolve the issue. Grievances may arise 
out of the following situations: (1 ) violations of the
agreement, (2) disagreement over facts, (3) interpretation 
of the agreement, (4) application of the agreement, and 
(5) differences of opinion as to the reasonableness or
■^Sumner H. Slichter, et. al. , The Impact of 
Collective Bargaining on Management (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1962) , p. 694.
2U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Collec­
tive Bargaining Agreements: Grievance Procedures, Bulletin
1425-1, p. 1.
3fairness of various actions. Inclusion of a provision 
for voluntary arbitration in the agreement is recognition 
of the potential for unresolved conflict which pervades 
most forms of human organization.
Union contracts impose obligations on management 
which do not exist in non-union employment, thus creating 
the basis for formalized grievances. Grievance disputes 
are legitimitized by the union-management contract and are 
dealt with through the formal arrangements provided by the 
agreement in the form of grievance procedures. A typical 
grievance procedure for a large employer (1,000 or more 
employees) involves four stages, with successive stages re­
presenting higher authority levels of union and management 
representatives. The following grievance procedure is 
illustrative.^ It is a four-stage process requiring move­
ment of the dispute from plant floor level, to plant per­
sonnel supervisory level, to plant management, to corporate 
management, and finally to arbitration.
. . . All grievances will be settled in the 
following manner:
First stage: Between the employee and one
department shop steward and/or one grievance 
committeeman, and the foreman or the depart­
ment supervisor. . . .
■^Slichter, o£. cit. , pp. 694-695.
4The Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 1425-1, 
op. cit., p. 35.
Second stage: Between members of the
grievance committee. . . and the personnel 
supervisor. . . .
Third stage: Between members of the
grievance committee. . . and the plant 
manager or his authorized representative 
or representatives. . . .
Fourth stage: Between representatives
of the international union along with the 
local grievance committee and officials of 
the company. . . .
Arbitration
In the event the grievance shall not have 
been settled satisfactorily, the matter may 
be referred to arbitration. . . .
"In a broad sense the formal grievance procedures 
found in various labor agreements are very similar," inas­
much as there are always several steps involved— usually
". . . two lower steps and one or two higher steps followed
5by arbitration." However, since the grievance procedure 
is part of a negotiated contract the freedom of the parties 
allows them to agree to procedures which may vary widely 
along the following lines: (1) the degree of formality,
(2) the character of representation, (3) the regulation of
ggrievance activity, and (4) special grievance procedures. 
One important similarity is that 94 percent of the griev­
ance procedures terminate in arbitration— the submission of 
the dispute to a third party for final and binding decision
5Slichter, op. cit., pp. 721-722.
6Slichter, op. cit., p. 723.
This study is generally concerned with the arbitration pro­
cess and more specifically with the third party neutral who 
is called upon to render a decision— the labor arbitrator.
The Nature and Process of Grievance Arbitration
Grievance arbitration involves the submission of
unresolved contractually-related, labor-management disputes
arising during the term of the contract to a third party
for a final and binding decision. Arbitration is presently
the final step of the grievance procedure in 94 percent of
the collective bargaining agreements covering 96 percent
7of all union organized workers in the United States. The 
growth and acceptability of labor arbitration as a means of 
resolving labor-management conflict is reflected in the 
following statements. "In 1944, 1949, and 1952. . . arbi­
tration provisions were found in 73, 83, and 89 percent of
Othe agreements, respectively." The National War Labor 
Board (World War II) provided, "A tremendous stimulus in 
the use of grievance arbitration. . . through its policy of 
ordering the adoption of contract clauses providing for
7U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Collec­
tive Bargaining Agreements: Arbitration Procedures,
Bulletin 1425-6, p. 5.
®Loc. cit.
arbitration of disputes over interpretation or application
gof the agreement." This policy undoubtedly precipitated 
the almost unanimous inclusion of the arbitration clause 
as the final step of the grievance procedure in labor- 
management contracts throughout the United States today.
As one might suspect, there has been a similar 
pattern of growth for labor arbitrator appointments by the 
two principal appointing agencies, the Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service (refer to Figure 1-1), and the 
American Arbitration Association (refer to Figure 1-2).
The FMCS reported a nearly 300 percent increase in requests 
for appointments between 1964 and 1973, while the AAA re­
ported a more than 200 percent increase in requests for 
appointments for the same period.^ More recently, the 
demand for arbitrator panels has been increasing about 
20 percent per year.^ Thus, labor arbitration has become 
widely accepted by management and labor as a viable means
9Paul Prasow and Edward Peters, Arbitration and 
Collective Bargaining: Conflict Resolution in Labor Rela­
tions (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1970),
p. 8 .
■^FMCS and AAA data made available to this writer 




11FMCS Pamphlet, "25 Years of Service to Labor 
and Management, 1947-1952" (Washington, D.C.), p. 6 .
7
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Source: Data made available by American Arbitration
Association— National Office in Washington, D.C.
of resolving contractually-related disputes. Its contribu 
tion toward promotion of industrial peace is limited only 
by its ability to serve the parties efficiently and effec­
tively.
The Labor Arbitrator
Who are the persons called upon by industry to
serve and how are they chosen? It has been estimated that
". . . in the entire nation three hundred arbitrators at
12most handle 90 percent of the cases.” This estimate is 
apparently supported by results of a recent survey con­
ducted by Joseph S. Murphy, retiring Vice President of the 
American Arbitration Association. Mr. Murphy surveyed 571 
arbitrators listed by AAA and found the following:
Labor arbitrators collected almost $23$ 
million in over 4,000 cases during 1972.
One hundred and twenty-five arbitrators 
received more than $5,000 from cases.
Sixty arbitrators received more than 
$10,000 from cases.
The usual charges are between $125 and 
$200 per day.
Arbitrators charged an average 1.44 study 
days for each hearing in 1972, about the
12Prasow and Peters, 0£. cit., p. 15; also see 
Harold W. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining (New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 180.
10
same as in past years. (This is in 
addition to actual time spent hearing 13 
the case which is typically 1 or 2 days.)
Further substantiating the apparent fact that a 
relatively very few persons actually do most of the arbi­
trating is the following statement by William J. Kilberg, 
General Counsel of the FMCS. "Approximately 25 percent of
the arbitrators on the FMCS roster are responsible for
1475 percent of the cases assigned."
The main thrust of this study is to learn some­
thing about the value systems of this seemingly small group 
of professionals who influence, through their arbitration 
awards, the basic structure and process of collective bar­
gaining, and who share the responsibility for the effective­
ness and future success of labor arbitration as an institu­
tion. A closer look at the individuals comprising this 
group will bring into sharper focus the basic hypotheses 
of this study.
Using a sample quite similar to that used in this
research, Brian L. King compiled the following information
15on active labor arbitrators:
13Bureau of National Affairs, "Bulletin to Manage­
ment" (Washington, D.C., April 5, 1973), p. 7.
14William J. Kilberg, "The FMCS and Arbitration: 
Problems and Prospects," Monthly Labor Review (April, 1971), 
p. 40.
15Brian L. King, "Some Aspects of the Active Labor 
Arbitrator," Personnel Journal (February, 1971), pp. 115- 
123.
11
As a group, labor arbitrators are highly 
educated men with a great deal of 'real 
world' experience.
In 1969 the successful arbitrator was 
57.9 years of age.
The typical arbitrator's primary experience 
in labor relations derived from National 
War Labor Board experience or with the Wage 
Stabilization Board (Korean War).
Of those arbitrators under age 50, 85.7 per­
cent were attorneys.
The vast majority of arbitrators are either 
attorneys or educators (primarily in schools 
of business and/or economics) and are about 
evenly divided in number.
A careful analysis of the Bureau of National 
Affairs Labor Arbitration Reports, Volumes 41-55, covering 
the period September, 1963 through February, 1971, revealed 
that over 71 percent of the arbitration cases published 
during this period were decided by labor arbitrators who 
were members of the National Academy of Arbitrators. The 
NAA is the only professional association for labor arbi­
trators in the United States. It appears that this member­
ship is responsible for the bulk of the labor arbitration 
work done. The following is a statement of policy relative 
to NAA membership:"^
Membership in the National Academy of 
Arbitrators is conferred by vote of the 
Board of Governors upon recommendation of 
the Membership Committee of the Academy.
In considering applications for membership,
"^National Academy of Arbitrators, Membership 
Directory (1973-1974), p. 3.
12
the Academy will apply the following 
standards: (1) The applicant should be
of good moral character, as demonstrated 
by adherence to sound ethical standards 
in professional activities. (2A) The 
applicant should have substantial and 
current experience as an impartial arbi­
trator of labor-management disputes, or 
(2B) in the alternative the applicant 
with limited but current experience in 
arbitration should have attained general 
recognition through scholarly publication 
or other activities as an impartial author­
ity on labor-management relations. In 
evaluating the applicant's experience, the 
Academy will take into account his general 
acceptability to the parties.
Certainly there are many persons in our society 
who are highly qualified, according to the foregoing charac­
teristics, and who would like to serve industry as impartial 
labor arbitrators. What then, are the determining qualifi­
cations for entry to the labor arbitration field? Actually, 
there is but one indispensable qualification for becoming 
an arbitrator— acceptance by the conflicting parties. Such 
acceptance is difficult to achieve, as suggested by the fol­
lowing statement relative to the arbitrator selection pro­
cedure. ̂
They are checked upon, cross-referenced 
and indexed by trade associations, union 
research departments, law firms, individual 
industrial relations directors and union 
business agents. There are even several 
firms which make a specialty of providing
17Donald B. Straus, "Labor Arbitration and Its 
Critics," The Arbitration Journal, Vol. 20 (No. 4, 1965), 
p. 197; also see Davey, op. cit~  P» 181.
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information about individual arbitrators 
and their performance as reported by com­
panies that have used them before— a sort 
of private FBI whose dossiers are available 
for a fee. Opinions about their intelligence, 
performance, character and adherence to evi­
dence and contract terms are solicited from 
many sources before they become the selection 
of both parties, at least in any case of 
significance to the parties.
There is little doubt that labor and management
prefer experienced arbitrators. This attitude is at least
partially responsible for the shortage of new, acceptable
arbitration talent and has resulted in heavy workloads for
18a few, causing lengthy delays in the rendering of awards.
The parties' attitudes are aptly expressed in the following 
19passage.
New blood, they say, give us new blood. So 
now and then, when we submit a panel of arbi­
trators, we slip in the name of a promising 
young man, a comer, and who are the ones we 
hear from? You're so right. Those who com­
plain the most that we make up panels by 
shuffling around the same little group of 
people. We tried to get a line on him, 
they'll say, and he's indexed for a mere 
handful of cases; he's still wet behind the 
ears and I had to use up a valuable challenge 
to knock him off. What are you trying to do 
to us?
The Labor Arbitrator's Decision Process 
The actual arbitration process is quasi-judicial 
in nature in that the arbitrator must listen to the case,
18Kilberg, 0£. cit., p. 40.
19Prasow, o£. cit., p. 16.
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interpret pertinent contract provisions, and render a
definite decision. The labor arbitrator, however, is
endowed by the parties which, he serves with a wide range
of latitude in interpreting the situation. Supreme Court
Justice Douglas, in an opinion which greatly enhanced the
power and prestige of the arbitration process, contributed
20the following observation.
The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because 
of the parties' confidence in his knowledge 
of the common law of the shop and their trust 
in his personal judgment to bring to bear con­
siderations which are not expressed in the 
contract as criteria for judgment. The par­
ties expect that his judgment of a particular 
grievance will reflect not only what the con­
tract says but, insofar as the collective 
bargaining agreement permits, such factors 
as the effect upon productivity of a particu­
lar result, its consequence to the morale of 
the shop, his judgment whether tensions will 
be heightened or diminished. For the parties' 
objective in using the arbitration process is 
primarily to further their common goal of un­
interrupted production under the agreement, 
to make the agreement serve their specialized 
needs. The ablest judge cannot be expected 
to bring the same experience and competence 
to bear upon the determination of a grievance, 
because he cannot be similarly informed.
However enlightened the foregoing opinion (there are those
who question that characterization), the labor arbitrator's
flexibility in seeking and applying remedies is limited
by these criteria. "His decision cannot contradict or go
beyond (1) the written agreement, (2 ) the record developed
20United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & 
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), p. 582.
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by the parties at the hearing, and (3) the submission agree-
2 1ment." A model of the labor arbitrator's decision-making 
process has been developed in light of the foregoing con­
straints.
The decision model represented in Figure 1-3 is 
necessarily an abstraction from the reality of the total 
environmental milieu within which the labor arbitrator makes 
his decision. As is the case with any model, much has been 
omitted from consideration. That bit of reality which re­
mains in the present model has been carefully selected to 
suit the purposes of this researcher in delineating the 
two sets of interacting factors of the decision-making 
process: the external factors and the internal factors.
FIGURE 1-3











21Prasow, 0£. cit., p. 17.
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The external factors of the model are: the 
contract, the parties' briefs and testimony, and the sub­
mission agreement. These external factors comprise what 
normally are held to be the "facts" of any labor arbitra­
tion case. Indeed, these are the factors which bear the 
burden of representing the reality which exists in any 
labor-management relationship. The external factors re­
ceive primary attention both in actual labor arbitration
proceedings and arbitration-related research. The follow-
22ing statement mirrors the situation.
The focus has been on identifying high 
quality information and having it enter 
the decision-making system in an unfil­
tered manner. The legal requirements 
are that the information be relevant and 
material to the issues at hand and that 
all parties have access to the same 
information. (emphasis added)
There can be little doubt that the above statement is 
aimed directly at the external factors of the decision­
making model. And yet,
. . . the values held by the arbitrator 
subtley influence his selection and organi­
zation of what he decides are 'relevant' 
data, his emphasis of certain evidence and 
de-emphasis of other, his acceptance of a 
certain procedural method, his attitude 
toward prior arbitration awards, and his 23 
literal or broad reading of the contract.
22Joseph P. Yaney, "Validating the Arbitration 
Process," Personnel Journal, Vol. 51 (No. 3, March, 1972),
p. 181.
23James A. Gross, "Value Judgments m  the Deci­
sions of Labor Arbitrators," Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, Vol. 21 (No. 1), p. 55.
The latter statement introduces the internal 
factors of the decision-making model, the values and atti­
tudes of professional labor arbitrators. These are the 
factors which contain the criteria governing the merit and 
thrust given the external factors, and yet, these same 
values and attitudes have been almost completely ignored 
in the literature of labor arbitration.
The impact of personal values on the decision­
making process is well-recognized in the management liter-
O Aature. March and Simon suggest that these internal
factors constitute a "frame of reference" which has been 
defined as: "A system of standards or values, usually
merely implicit, underlying and to some extent controlling
an action, or the expression of any attitude, belief, or
25 26idea." (emphasis added) Further, Parsons has said:
^ S e e  George W. England, "Personal Value Systems 
of American Managers," Academy of Management Journal,
Vol. 10 (No. 1, March, 1967), pp. 53-68; William D. 'Guth 
and Renato Tagiuri, "Personal Values and Corporate Strat­
egy," Harvard Business Review (September-October, 1965), 
pp. 123-132; and Robert C. Shirley, "The Influence of Per­
sonal Values on Corporate Strategy," Current Concepts in 
Management No. 9̂ (Louisiana State University, July, 1972).
25H. B. English and A. C. English, A Comprehen­
sive Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytical 
Terms (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1959) .
2 6Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in 
Modern Societies (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960)
p. 173.
Beliefs and values are actualized, par­
tially and imperfectly, in realistic 
situations of social interaction and 
the outcomes are always co-determined 
by the values and the realistic exigen­
cies.
In the context of the arbitrator's decision model, values 
are the internal factors and Parson's "realistic exigen­
cies" equate with the external factors of each case. Out­
comes (decisions), then, are always "co-determined" by 
interaction of decision-system components. Research by 
Harris and Gross suggests the validity of the previous 
argument.
Harris offers the following observations based 
on case data dating back to 1942. On the fact that company 
awards exceed the union's— "It may be, therefore, that a
27feeling of primacy prevails in the minds of arbitrators."
On the fact that an increasing percentage difference in
awards for the company as union size diminishes— "This
suggests the thought that arbitrators give weight to the
2 8relative bargaining strength of the parties. . . . "
Harris further suggests that arbitrators are growing more 
sympathetic to labor.
27Philip Harris, "The Influence of Institutional 
Factors on Arbitration Awards," Labor Law Journal (Novem­
ber, 1969) , p. 718.
2 8Harris, ibid., p. 719.
19
Gross offers the following observations based on
case data involving subcontracting and out-of-unit trans- 
29fers of work.
Consciously or unconsciously, arbitrators 
bring these ideas (values) about ethics, 
man, law, private property, economics, and 
so forth to their cases.
. , . the arbitrator's reasoning and deci­
sions reflect dominant social values, in 
particular, the priority of economic ef­
ficiency.
This study attempts to raise to a conscious level 
these submerged aspects of arbitral decision-making.
Need for Study of Labor Arbitrator's Values
An exhaustive search of the literature of labor 
arbitration reveals very little effort in the behavioral 
area and certainly no previous attempt to systematically 
identify and analyze the values and the attitudes of pro­
fessional labor arbitrators through the use of accepted 
behavioral and statistical techniques. The literature 
does raise the question of the effect of values and atti­
tudes on the decisions of labor arbitrators, as previously 
noted. However, "Much of the research on the subject of 
grievance arbitration has been done by economists and 
lawyers," which is not surprising, " . . .  since most of 
the academicians who are knowledgeable in the field come
29Gross, op. cit., p. 55.
30from these disciplines." The nature of such research 
centers around institutional factors, the grievance arbi­
tration process and related labor law, each relying pri­
marily on the actual arbitration cases as reported by the 
Bureau of National Affairs' Labor Arbitration Reports. As 
a result, these studies tend to rely on secondary informa­
tion and reveal very little, if any, development of orig-
Ol . . .inal data. In addition, this researcher initiated a 
DATRIX (Direct Access to Reference Information: A Zerox
Service) search for citations of all doctoral dissertations 
written during the period 1938-1970, through University 
Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan. The DATRIX search,
No. 930949, was ordered on March 2, 1973 and yielded a 
total of 28 references. A review of these references con­
firmed the nature of arbitration research performed here­
tofore, as described above. No research directly or in­
directly concerned the value systems of labor arbitrators, 
which are the prime concerns of this study.
This research will not treat the specific ques­
tion of the effect of values and attitudes on the decisions 
of labor arbitrators, which we have recognized to be part 
of the thrust of the literature. Instead, it will
30Fleming, 0£. cit., p. 206.
O 1See for example, Paul Prasow, et. al., Arbitra­
tion and Collective Bargaining (McGraw-Hill Co., 1970) ,
The Selected Bibliography, pp. 396-412; also, Davey, op. 
cit., p. 167.
concentrate directly upon identification of values and 
attitudes held by professional labor arbitrators and at­
tempt to relate these values and attitudes to certain 
experiential and demographic variables in the backgrounds 
of labor arbitrators. "Arbitrators, unlike judges, do not
have a common professional background, nor are they all
32trained in the same system of thinking." The rationale
for this study is that since labor arbitrators come from
diverse backgrounds their values and attitudes may be
equally diverse. Consider, for example, the following 
33quotations.
The result (decision) might well vary 
depending on whether the arbitrator was 
a lawyer or an economist.
I feel that the result would vary from 
arbitrator to arbitrator, depending pri­
marily upon the particular arbitrator's 
personal feeling regarding the scope of 
the management prerogative. . . .
Much more depends on the background and 
experience of the particular arbitrator. . . .
Is there a difference in whether a professional
labor arbitrator is a lawyer-arbitrator or an economist-
arbitrator, or trained in some other discipline? Is there
a difference in whether he has little or a great deal of
labor arbitration experience? Is there a difference in
whether he lives in the South or in the North, East or West
32Fleming, o£. cit., p. 79.
33Fleming, 0£. cit., p. 96.
Could it be that even with their wide diversity of back­
grounds and experiences, professional labor arbitrators 
actually have similar impressions of certain concepts re­
lated to industrial relations? These are the types of 
questions which this research seeks to answer.
Statement of the Hypotheses 
The following statement represents generally 
the relationships with which this study is concerned. The 
specific hypotheses to be tested are derived from this gen­
eral statement:
The attitudes of professional labor arbi­
trators toward certain cognitive objects34 
significantly related to occupational roles 
are in part a function of their education, 
age, and experience.
Hypothesis 1: Lawyer-arbitrators have different atti­
tudes about certain cognitive objects than 
economist-arbitrators.
Hypothesis 2: Lawyer-arbitrators have different attitudes
about certain cognitive objects than arbi­
trators classified as "Other."
Hypothesis 3: Economist-arbitrators have different atti­
tudes about certain cognitive objectives
34 "Cognitive objects" are any concrete or ab­
stract things perceived and "known" by individuals. People 
groups, the government, and education are examples of 
cognitive objects. Fred N. Kerlinger,- Foundations of 
Behavioral Research (second edition, New York, N.Y.: Holt,









than arbitrators classified as "Other."
4: Younger arbitrators have different atti­
tudes about certain cognitive objects 
than older arbitrators.
5: More experienced arbitrators, in terms of
years, have different attitudes about cer­
tain cognitive objects than less experienced 
arbitrators.
6 : More experienced arbitrators, in terms of
decisions, have different attitudes about 
certain cognitive objects than less expe­
rienced arbitrators.
7: Part-time arbitrators have different atti­
tudes about certain cognitive objects than 
full-time arbitrators.
8 : Arbitrators who have worked for a federal
labor agency have different attitudes about 
certain cognitive objects than those who 
have not been employed by a federal labor 
agency.
9: Arbitrators, who have held management posi­
tions in private firms have different atti­
tudes about certain cognitive objects than 
those without such management experience.
10: Arbitrators who have held union membership
have different attitudes about certain
cognitive objects than arbitrators without 
union membership experience.
Hypothesis 11: Arbitrators' .attitudes about certain cogni­
tive objects are a function of their geo­
graphic location.
Hypothesis 12: Arbitrators who are members of the National
Academy of Arbitrators have different atti­
tudes about certain cognitive objects than 
non-members.
Purpose of this Research 
This research is an extension of the literature 
of labor arbitration into the area of values and attitudes 
of professional labor arbitrators, an area of research not 
previously broached. It is essentially an attempt to 
determine possible differences in the values and attitudes 
of labor arbitrators, such differences being possibly 
structured according to the independent variables of age, 
education, and experience. The design of this research is 
expected to yield empirical information identifying certain 
values and attitudes of labor arbitrators. It is expected 
to yield valuable insights into those " . . .  deep and ob­
scure forces which guide a judge or an arbitrator to his 
35conclusion." These "forces" to which renowned arbitrator
■  I I I  ! ! - ■ ■ ■ . ■ ■  Ill —  ■ ■  I ■ - ■  /
35Peter Seitz, Comment on "Value Judgments in the 
Decisions of Labor Arbitrators," by James A. Gross, Indus­
trial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 21 (No. 1), p. 55.
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Mr. Peter Seitz refers are the internal factors of values
and attitudes contained in the labor arbitrator's decision
model. According to Davoy, " . . .  arbitrators differ in
their views. . . and in their philosophical approaches to
36the task of contract construction."
This research seeks partially to fill a gap pre­
sently existing in the literature of labor arbitration.
37According to Gross: . . . little is known about arbitral
decision making.
Labor arbitration is a complex interaction 
of values, fact, and power. Comprehension 
of this complex interaction requires a multi­
disciplinary approach.
Studies of arbitrators are needed.
Analysis of arbitrators ought to include not 
only surveys of their social and educational 
backgrounds, professions, attitudes, and 
opinions, but also in-depth biographies which 
will aid in understanding their philosophies 
and techniques.
The identification of value premises is just 
the beginning. What is needed also is a study 
of the social causes and social effects of 
these values.
In summary, the primary purpose of this empirically-based 
research is to identify existing values and attitudes of 
professional labor arbitrators and to determine whether 
significant differences exist as they relate to variables
36Davey, o£. cit., p. 168.
37Gross, o£. cit., p. 72.
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associated with the backgrounds of professional labor 
arbitrators.
Methods of Research 
Essentially this study involves the accumulation 
and analysis of primary data. However, the hypotheses to 
be tested were suggested following extensive examination 
of secondary sources. A discussion of research methods 
follows.
Secondary Research 
The hypotheses with which this study is concerned 
were developed following a thorough and exhaustive search 
of the literature of labor arbitration. Reference to the 
secondary research is included where it was pertinent for 
background material, where it adds depth to the analysis of 
the hypotheses, and where it may substantiate the analysis 
of the hypotheses.
Primary Research 
This study is primarily concerned with hypotheses 
testing. A rather sophisticated primary research project 
was undertaken involving the following steps:
1. Sample selection.
2. Questionnaire design.
3. Analysis of the data.
At this point the sample selection, questionnaire design, 
and the methods of analysis will be explained. Subsequent
27
chapters will cover analysis of the data and determination 
of conclusions.
Sample and Response
The universe for this study was composed of two 
sources. First was the 1973-74 Membership Directory of 
the National Academy of Arbitrators, containing 420 names 
and addresses. This directory was made available by 
Mr. Alfred C. Dybeck, Secretary of the National Academy of 
Arbitrators. Second was the Bureau of National Affairs'
Labor Arbitration Reports, Volumes 41-55, containing re­
ports of arbitration cases and a bibliographic listing of 
all contributing labor arbitrators.
Based on the advice of practicing labor arbitra­
tors, it was decided that the sample would consist of one- 
half NAA members and one-half non-members. As a result, 
of the 400 labor arbitrators included in the sample, 200 
were members of the National Academy of Arbitrators and 
200 were not. Figure 1-4 indicates the total mailout and 
return by geographic region.
The questionnaire was placed in the mail on 
February 28, 1974, and no return was included if it was 
received after April 6 , 1974. A follow-up letter (see 
Appendix A) was mailed out on March 18, 1974. Of the 400 
forms mailed out 202, or 51 percent, were returned. Fifty- 
eight questionnaires were not usable for the following 
reasons:
FIGURE 1-4
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1. Incomplete answers (4)
2. Returned by Post Office as non­
deliverable (43)
3. Returned too late to be included 
in the analysis (6 )
4. Deceased (5)
After reducing the sample size by those returned question­
naires that were not deliverable, or addressed to deceased 
persons, the usable net percentage return was 43 percent.'
Questionnaire
The design of the questionnaire (see Appendix A)
was based on primary and secondary research, the advice of
professional labor arbitrators, a priori reasoning, and the
needs of the study.
The first part of the questionnaire utilizes the
3 8semantic differential technique which is a psychological 
construct designed to measure empirically the connotative 
meanings attached to particular concepts by individuals.
The second and concluding part of the questionnaire was 
designed to collect objective background data.
The Pilot Test
A pilot test of the questionnaire was conducted 
with the assistance of 20 professional labor arbitrators
38The semantic differential is explained further 
in Chapter II. The standard source is Charles E. Osgood, 
et. al., The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana, Illinois: 
University of Illinois Press, 1957).
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from the Southeastern region of the United States during 
November and December of 1973.
Initial contact was established over the tele­
phone and each arbitrator's cooperation was solicited. 
Following the telephone conversation a copy of the question­
naire was placed in the mail, provided the arbitrator was 
agreeable.
As a result of the pilot test the initial 16 con­
cepts and 16 scales were reduced to 8 concepts and 10 scales 
for the final questionnaire. Modifications were also made 
to that part of the questionnaire designed to collect back­
ground data as a result of the pilot test.
The complete questionnaire consisted of seven 
pages. Five pages were devoted to semantic differential 
testing, including instructions and the gathering of back­
ground data, and were arranged in booklet form. Each 
questionnaire was accompanied by a letter of transmittal 
from the writer, an endorsement letter from Paul M. Hebert, 
Dean of the Louisiana State University School of Law, who 
is a prominent labor arbitrator and a member of the National 
Academy of Arbitrators, and a self-addressed return enve­
lope to be mailed under Business Reply Permit No. 4657.
Methods of Analysis
The data were subjected to the analysis of vari­
ance statistical technique, as well as to such commonly 
accepted statistical procedures as the "t" test and
regression and correlation analysis. Other techniques 
were used specifically to analyze the semantic differen­
tial. The data analysis was.performed on an IBM 7040 at 
the L.S.U. Computer Research Center, under the direction 
of Dr. Kenneth L. Koonce.
Limitations of the Study
Due to financial and time constraints, the mail 
questionnaire method was used to collect empirical data. 
There is no question of the impact of this procedure on the 
number of responses. However, the usual risk of a poor 
response rate was at least partially mitigated by the fact 
that the sample was composed of professional persons, and 
the effect of the follow-up letter.
As with any primary research of this nature, 
there exists the normal concern relative to randomness of 
the sample. Given the population and sample obtained, this 
writer feels that the response was sufficiently random to 
satisfy the necessary randomness assumption of sampling 
theory.
Since no similar study exists, there are no secon 
dary sources with which to compare findings.
There is no way practical, to specify all factors 
influencing the values and attitudes of individuals. It 
seems certain, however, that the factors considered by this 
study are among the most important.
Preview
The following chapter explains the research 
methodology used in this study and describes construction 
of the questionnaire, as well as the statistical methods 
of analysis employed in data analysis.
In Chapter III attention is devoted to testing 
the hypotheses concerned with Education. This is followed 
by analysis of the hypotheses concerned with Age in Chap-' 
ter IV. Chapter V is devoted to testing of hypotheses con­
cerned with Experience and Geographic Location. Chapter VI 
contains the summary, conclusions, implications, and recom­
mendations of the study.
CHAPTER II
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
One of the primary objectives of this empirical 
study was to partially identify and analyze the values and 
attitudes of labor arbitrators. This chapter is concerned 
with an explanation of the psychological "tool" used to 
identify and measure the attitudes of arbitrators, the 
semantic differential technique.^" The statistical tech­
niques used to test the hypotheses and analyze the semantic 
differential will also be described in this chapter.
Construction and Operation of the Semantic Differential 
Logic of the Semantic Differential
The semantic differential test is a psychological
construct designed to measure empirically the connotative
2meanings attached to "cognitive objects" by individuals 
in a series of bipolar adjectives scales. The logic of 
this technique follows.
■^Charles E. Osgood, et. al., The Measurement of 
Meaning (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois
Press, 1957)
oFred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral 
Research (second edition, New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, Inc., 1973), p. 19.
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"We begin by postulating a 'semantic space', a
region of some unknown dimensionality and Euclidian in 
3character." The semantic differential test defines a cog­
nitive object as a point in this space. Thus, the semantic 
differential allows one to differentiate the connotative 
meanings of concepts (cognitive objects) among two or more 
individuals or groups of individuals by analyzing the rela­
tive positions of various points in the semantic space.
For example, the semantic differential has been used suc­
cessfully to measure the psychological differences between
4labor and management groups. An example will serve to il­
lustrate how the differences may appear in semantic space.
Osgood has defined the dimensions of the semantic 
space along three lines: evaluative, potency, and activity.
For purposes of this study it was determined that the se­
mantic space would be defined by using the two dimensions of 
evaluative and potency. The "activity" dimension did not 
seem appropriate since the purpose of this study does not 
involve the measurement of motion and action which the 
activity dimension seeks to define. The evaluative dimen­
sion is judgmental and signifies whether a concept is 
"good" or "bad." The potency dimension signifies the in­
tensity of "goodness" or "badness." A two-dimensional
3Osgood, 0£. cit., p. 25.
^Carl H. Weaver, "The Quantification oft the Frame 
of Reference in Labor-Management Communication," Journal of 
Applied Psychology, Vol. 42 (No. 1, February, 1958), pp. 1-9.
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The specific concepts of "me," "labor," and
"management" have been placed in this space, assuming the 
results of a semantic differential test were "labor" = 
(2,3), 2 units of evaluative and 3 units of potency, 
"management" = (5,6), and "me" = (6,7). These ordered 
pairs of numbers assigned to the concepts are "labels" 
which represent "meanings." The meaning of a concept comes 
from its relation not only to the two dimensions, but also 
from its relations to other concepts. Thus, each concept 
has both "absolute meaning" resulting from the assignment 
of ordered numbers, and "relative meaning" indicated by 
spatial proximity among concepts. In the above example,
5Adapted from Kerlinger, ££. cit., p. 568.
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the concepts "me" and "management" have similar meaning 
which is different from the connotative meaning attached 
to "labor." Further, the concepts "me" and "management" 
are perceived as "good" and "strong," while labor is low 
on both "goodness" and "strength."
As mentioned earlier, the semantic differential 
test has been used to measure the differences in meanings 
of concepts between groups representing labor and manage-
gment. Labor arbitrators serve these two parties by 
rendering impartial decisions in dispute settlement. The 
literature is most convincing in suggesting that decisions 
may vary depending on whether the arbitrator is an econo­
mist or a lawyer, experienced or inexperienced. It follows 
that the semantic differential is an appropriate test and 
may yield empirical insight concerning the suspected dif­
ferences between different groups of labor arbitrators.
The selection of specific concepts indigenous to 
the area of labor relations to be used in this study is 
covered next.
Concept Selection 
The first step in designing the semantic differen­
tial test is the selection of concepts (or other stimuli) 
to be evaluated on a series of bipolar adjective scales.
Final determination of the concepts used in this study was
6Weaver, o£. cit., pp. 1-9.
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based on the nature of the research, the hypotheses to be 
tested, and results of the pilot test mentioned in Chap­
ter I. In seeking differences the two general requirements 
for the selection of concepts are: (1) the concepts must
elicit varied responses from different individuals, other­
wise they are useless for research purposes, and (2) the
7concepts should cover to some extent the semantic space.
The selected concepts have been carefully chosen from the 
current literature of Industrial Relations in order to meet 
these two general requirements. In addition, it is felt 
that these specific concepts are often at the core of the 
decision-making process.
The following eight concepts were selected for 
use in the semantic differential test:
WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS (W)*
THE LABOR MOVEMENT (L)
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS (R)




UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION­
MAKING AREAS (P)
7Kerlinger, o£. cit., p. 570.
*Identification symbols for each concept.
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To mitigate against the inherent danger of 
reponse bias and to reduce possible effects of interde­
pendency among concepts, the following safeguards were 
taken. First, each concept was placed on an individual 
page. Second, the concepts were arranged so that no two 
concepts of the three categories (to be explained in 
Chapter III) were back-to-back (with one exception).
Third, in order to gain uniformity, the comment, "Please 
mark the series of descriptive scales according to what 
the following concept means to you," was placed at the 
top of each page containing a concept.
With the selection and arrangement of concepts 
completed, the next step was to determine the bipolar 
adjective scales that were used to obtain responses to the 
stimuli.
Scale Selection
The second step in the construction of the se­
mantic differential test is the selection of appropriate 
bipolar adjective scales which are used to rate the con­
cepts. The two main criteria for scale selection are:
(1) that the scales be relevant to the concepts used, and
(2) factor representativeness. The.latter criterion con­
cerns the rating of scales along the dimensions of evalua­
tive and potency. Osgood, £t. al., have determined through 
factor analysis that certain scales are heavily loaded 
along one or the other of the two dimensions. Using
plists provided by Osgood, several evaluative and potency 
scales were chosen to be used in the pilot study. Of the 
16 scales used in the pilot study eight were chosen for 
final questionnaire use. Two additional potency scales 
were substituted to make a total of 10 scales, five evalua­
tive and five potency.
The following 10 bipolar adjective scales were 
selected for use in the semantic differential test:
Evaluative —  good - bad
fair - unfair 
valuable - worthless 
important - unimportant 
successful - unsuccessful
Potency  wide - narrow
rigid - flexible* 
severe - lenient 
strong - weak 
rugged - delicate*
To eliminate response bias, the scales were ro­
tated vertically and horizontally. Thus, the evaluative 
and potency scales were interspersed and the scale direc­
tion (positive or negative) was rotated randomly. The 
final format for the semantic differential test appears 
in Appendix A.
When all of the above steps had been accomplished 
the semantic differential test portion of the questionnaire 
was ready for mailing. A set of instructions was developed
QOsgood, ££. cit., pp. 35-61.
♦Substitute scales not used in the pilot test.
indicating the use of the instrument. (See Appendix A)
The responses by the arbitrators served to locate the con- 
cepts in the semantic space for purposes of statistical 
comparisons and analysis. A discussion of the statistical 
techniques used in the analysis follows.
Methods of Analysis 
Two primary tools of statistical analysis were 
used to analyze the data yielded by the semantic differen­
tial test: analysis of variance and the "t" test. Also,
correlation and regression analyses were used to assess 
the magnitudes of relationships existing within the seman­
tic differential data.
The Analysis of Variance
The analysis of variance methodology is general 
in the sense that the differences of two or more groups 
can be tested for statistical significance simultaneously. 
This technique was used extensively in this study since 
most of the independent variables involved three or more 
classifications. For example, degree is categorized into 
three groups: lawyers, economists, and "others."
The "t" Test
Where the analysis of variance indicated the 
existence of statistically significant differences between 
three or more groups, it became necessary to use the "t" 
test in order to isolate the particular significant
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difference. In the case of the example above, does a dif­
ference of interest exist between lawyers and economists, 
lawyers and "others," or perhaps economists and "others?"
The "t" test answered this type of question. "Probably the 
most common use of the "t" test is to determine whether the 
performance difference between two groups of subjects is 
significant." Thus, the "t" test was used in this study 
to test hypotheses suggesting statistically significant 
differences in the meanings of concepts between groups of 
labor arbitrators classified according to age, education, 
and experience.
The previous explanation of the "semantic space" 
suggests that the position of any concept in this space 
may be influenced by either dimension, evaluative or potency. 
Therefore, where either dimension was found to be statis­
tically significantly different between compared groups 
the concept was judged as being statistically significantly 
different.
Decision Criteria
It was decided that a level of significance of 
.05 would be used throughout the study to determine whether 
significant differences existed in the meaning of concepts 
between groups. In accordance with the preceeding section,
QJames L. Bruning and B. L. Kintz, Computational 
Handbook of Statistics (Glenview, Illinois: Scott,
Poresman and Company, 1968), p. 9.
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the connotative meaning was judged to be significant where 
either dimension differed between groups at the .05 level 
of significance. At the .05.level of significance it would 
be expected that only five of 100 scales would differ due 
to chance.
The Analysis of Concept Clusters
"If two concepts are close together in semantic . 
space, they are alike in meaning for the individual or 
group making the judgments. Conversely, if they are sepa­
rated in semantic space they differ in meaning."^ As a 
measurement of linear distance between concepts, Osgood 
offers the widely accepted "D" statistic normally used in 
evaluating semantic differential data. Calculation of the 
"D" statistic will yield a measure of the distance between 
concepts in the semantic space which serves as an indicator 
of the relative meanings between concepts. Unfortunately, 
the "D" statistic in pure form ", . . is somewhat descrip­
tive and impressionistic.1,11 Therefore, this researcher 
has resorted to correlation and regression analysis in 
determining whether the distance between clusters of con­
cepts are statistically significantly different. Such 
analysis is a statistical improvement upon the "D" statis­
tic, for it determines whether the existing differences
10Kerlinger, 0£. cit., p. 574.
■^Kerlinger, 0£. cit., p. 576.
are significant. Alternatively, the existence of differ­
ences is known, but are they statistically significant?
The "D" statistic does not answer this question, but op­
tional statistical analysis employed in this study does 
answer the question and is reported with the testing of 
hypotheses.
The Sample
In Chapter I it was established that a relatively 
few labor arbitrators, perhaps 300 to 400 in the United 
States, perform perhaps 75 to 90 percent of the arbitration 
work. It was also established that most of these labor 
arbitrators are members of the National Academy of Arbi­
trators. It follows that the universe should be amply 
represented by arbitrators who are members of the NAA.
Also known, as established in Chapter I, is that 
entry to the field of labor arbitration is severely restric 
ted by prevailing practices and attitudes of the parties 
who subscribe to labor arbitration services. The reluc­
tance of labor and management to request the services of 
inexperienced labor arbitrators suggests an investigation 
of the alleged differences between inexperienced and expe­
rienced arbitrators, NAA members and non-members, since 
experience is the main criteria for NAA membership. Hence, 
it was decided that the final sample of labor arbitrators 
should represent both NAA members and non-members.
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The sample was composed of 400 labor arbitrators, 
and was equally divided between NAA members and non-members. 
Those 200 NAA members chosen .for the sample were randomly 
selected from the 1973-1974 Membership Directory of the NAA.
Those 200 non-NAA members of the sample were 
selected primarily from the Bibliography contained in the 
Bureau of National Affairs' Labor Arbitration Reports,
Volumes 51-55, covering the period September, 1968 through 
February, 1971, which was the latest volume available. In 
order to secure the full 200 names and addresses of non­
members, it was necessary to go back even further to 
Volumes 41-50, covering the period September, 1963 through 
August/ 1968. As one might expect, there was a large number 
of non-deliverable questionnaires among the non-members 
selected from the BNA sources. Of the 43 non-deliverable 
questionnaires, 42 were non-NAA members selected from the 
BNA Reports. The reason that the questionnaires were not 
delivered was that the addresses were no longer correct.
But, even with this problem, the total response of 152 
questionnaires was about evenly distributed between NAA 
members and non-members. There were 75 NAA member respon­
ses and 77 non-member responses.
The total response of 152 usable questionnaires 
constituted 38 percent of the 400 questionnaires mailed 
out. The net usable percentage, after deleting those 
questionnaires which were non-deliverable and those ad­
dressed to deceased persons, was 43 percent.
The Data Gathering Technique
The data used to test the hypotheses of this 
study were accumulated from the sample described above by 
means of a questionnaire consisting of two parts. (See 
Appendix A) The first part was a semantic differential 
test designed to identify the connotative meanings of 
certain labor relations-oriented concepts. The second 
part of the questionnaire consisted of several questions 
designed to gather information relative to the labor arbi­
trators ' backgrounds concerning age, education, and experi­
ence. The respondents were provided the option of request­
ing a copy of the results of the study or remaining 
completely anonymous.
The questionnaires, bearing first-class postage, 
were put in the mail on February 27, 1974. A stamped, self- 
addressed envelope was included for return. A follow-up 
letter requesting support of the 285 non-respondents was 
placed in the mail on March 18, 1974. (Undoubtedly, some 
anonymous respondents were included in this second mail- 
out. )
Each questionnaire was numbered and dated upon 
return. Only 1 percent (4) of the 400 questionnaires sent 
out was returned non-usable due to incomplete information. 
Forty-three were not deliverable by the Post Office. Five 
were deceased and, therefore, non-deliverable. Six were 
returned too late to be included in the sample.
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Once the data were gathered the stage was set 
for testing the hypotheses as expressed in Chapter I.
CHAPTER III
RELATIONSHIP OF EDUCATION TO THE 
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL TEST
It has been suggested that the decisions of labor 
arbitrators may vary depending upon their educational back­
grounds, particularly whether the arbitrator is a lawyer .or 
an economist. When one considers the fact that the ranks 
of labor arbitrators are about equally divided between 
lawyers and economists, the question concerning the possible 
influence of educational background on arbitral decisions 
becomes even more fascinating. Of course, there are labor 
arbitrators who do not hold either a law degree or a degree 
in economics. This group has been labeled "other" for ana­
lytical purposes and comprises 12.5 percent of the sample.
The purpose of this chapter is to test Hypotheses 
1, 2, and 3 in an effort to determine the relationship(s), 
if any, between the attitudes and values of labor arbitra­
tors as measured by the semantic differential test and 
their educational backgrounds. Such analysis will have 
implications as to the validity of the arbitral decision­
making model developed in Chapter I.
The statistical techniques used to test all 
hypotheses in this study were: analysis of variance,
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"t" tests, and correlation and regression analysis. Results 
of the analysis of variance test for all factors are con­
tained in Table 3-1.
The analysis of variance technique yielded com­
parisons of the arbitrators' responses to the stimuli with 
respect to the independent variable associated with each 
hypothesis. The relevant independent variable for Hypoth­
eses 1, 2, and 3 was the type of educational degree held 
by the respondent arbitrators.
Table 3-1 is a summary of the results of the 
analysis of variance test, showing the significance of the 
F-ratios for each of the eight concepts as a function of: 
age, degree, experience (Expy, in terms of years), time 
(full-time or part-time), experience (Expn, in terms of 
total numbers of arbitration decisions rendered) , federal 
(Fed) employment experience, management (Mang) employment 
experience, labor (Labor) union membership experience, 
residence (Res, by region), and NAA membership. Each of 
the eight concepts was analyzed for statistically signifi­
cant differences according to the five evaluative scales 
and five potency scales. According to Osgood, "If there 
is a significant difference on any one dimension, the over­
all test will be significant. . . . Table 3-1 will be 
referred to throughout the discussion relative to testing
■^Charles E. Osgood, et. al. , The Measurement of 
Meaning (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois
Press, 1957).
TABLE 3-1
Significance of F-ratios for Concepts (by E & P) as a Function of Age, Degree, 
Experience (Years), Time, Experience (Decisions), Federal Employment, 
Managerial Employment, Labor Experience, Residence, NAA Membership
Concept Age Degree Expy Time Expn Fed Mang Labor Res NAA
Wage and Price Controls (E) N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S
(P) N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. ** N.S. N.S
The Labor Movement (E) N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. App. N.S. N.S
(P) N.S. N.S. N.S. ** N.S. * N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S
Right-to-Work Laws (E) N.S. * N.S. * N.S. ** N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S
(P) N.S. ** N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S
Compulsory Arbitration (E) N.S. ** N.S. N.S. N.S. * N.S. N.S. ** ( N.S
(P) N.S. ** * N.S. N.S. App. N.S. * N.S. N.S
Union Leadership (E) N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. * N.S. App. N.S
(P) N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S
Economic Efficiency (E) N.S. * N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. ** N.S. N.S. N.S
(P) N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. ** N.S. N.S. N.S
Management Rights (E) N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. * App. N.S. ** N.S
(P) N.S.. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S
Union Penetration of (E) * ** N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S
Mgt. Decision-Making (P) * App. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. **
N.S. = Not Significant (E) = Evaluative Scales
App. = Approaching Accepted Level of Significance = .10 (P) = Potency Scales
*Level of Significance = .05 
**Level of Significance = .01
of all hypotheses. The appendix contains the actual analy­
sis of variance table for each dependent variable analyzed. 
These tables contain the degrees of freedom, sum of squares, 
mean squares, and F-ratios for each concept analyzed. Sev­
eral two-way interactions were performed with the concepts 
grouped into the three classifications of labor-supportive, 
management-supportive, and legal, resulting in the identi­
fication of each classification as a separate cluster. Each 
statistical test was corrected for samples of unequal size.
Table 3-2 contains a Correlation Coefficient 
Matrix for Concepts by Evaluative and Potency Scales indi­
cating the correlation values and the level of significance 
for each comparison. It is particularly important to note 
that the evaluative scales and the potency scales for each 
concept are statistically significantly related. This 
signifies that the responses to the stimuli move in the 
same direction on the evaluative scales and the potency 
scales. One may conclude, therefore, that there was no 
confusion between the evaluative dimension and potency 
dimension for any concept. Thus, one may conclude, for 
example, that a concept judged to be "important" was also 
judged to be "strong," and conversely a concept judged to 
be "unimportant" was also judged to be "weak." The manner 
in which the respondent arbitrators were classified accord­
ing to education is discussed in the following section.
TABLE 3-2
Matrix of Correlation Coefficients for Concepts 
by Evaluative and Potency Dimensions
WE WP LE LP RE RP CE CP UE UP EE EP ME MP PE PP
WE **.34 .16 -.07 -.17 **-.27 .10 -.07 **.23 - .08 .15 .09 **.23 .06 .17 -.02
WP .08 .08 -.09 -.08 -.00 .12 **.30 **.25 -.01 .17 **.24 **.36 -.06 .06
LE **.30 -.07 -.08 .21 *.19 **.58 **.29 .01 - .05 **.29 .10 .03 .05
LP .01 .07 .11 .01 **.28 **.30 -.02 .06 .00 .11 -.02 .00
RE ** **.64 .28 **.33 .07 .17 .07 .03 **.32 **.33 .01 .01
RP .12 **.29 .02 **.29 -.13 .01 *.20 **.34 .03 .06
CE **.60 **.26 .09 -.03 - .02 **.26 .11 .09 -.16
CP .24 **.26 -.16 - .14 *.19 **.30 -.11 -.11
UE **.40 .15 .08 **.47 **.29 -.03 .03
UP -.11 **.25 **.23 **.36 -.10 -.01
EE **.41 **.33 .16 -.07 -.07
EP .16 **.29 -.02 .07
ME **.56 *-.21 -.17
MP *-.20 -.04
PE **.41
*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance = .01
E = Evaluative Scales 
P = Potency Scales
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Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified by












The sample was comprised of highly educated individuals 
involving, in some instances, persons with multiple profes­
sional degrees. In such cases, assignment to classification 
depended on this researcher's judgment and the criteria 
followed along these lines. Where the arbitrator held both 
a law degree and a degree in another field, it was assumed 
that the arbitrator was engaged in the legal profession and 
he (or she) was classified as lawyer.
Where the arbitrator held a degree in Economics, 
Business, or Labor Relations he (or she) was classified 
as economist. Again, the judgment of this researcher was 
necessary and it was determined that a person educated in 
Business or Labor Relations normally received a substantial 
background in Economics, thus justifying his classification 
as economist. All university degrees other than Law, Eco­
nomics, Business, or Labor Relations were classified 
"other."
spondents classified as "other" is quite diverse, with 
several educational areas being represented as follows:
The composition of the group of arbitrator re-
Engineering (8), Psychology (2), Sociology (2), History (2) 
Liberal Arts (2), Philosophy (1), Political Science (1), 
and Agriculture (1).
The Clustering of Concepts
Initial analysis of the data suggested the exist­
ence of certain statistical relations among the eight con­
cepts used in the study. Referring to Table 3-2, one can 
observe these significant correlations. The two concepts 
labeled THE LABOR MOVEMENT and UNION LEADERSHIP were cor­
related at the .01 level of significance for both evalua­
tive and potency scales. Such a high degree of correlation 
suggests that the assigned meanings of these particular 
concepts are very similar. The above concepts, along with 
UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS, were 
labeled and classified as "union-supportive" concepts for 
purposes of further statistical analysis.
Reference to Table 3-2 permits one to observe 
another set of highly correlated concepts, ECONOMIC EF­
FICIENCY and MANAGEMENT RIGHTS. The evaluative scales of 
these two concepts also correlated at the .01 level of 
significance. These two concepts were labeled and classi­
fied as "management-supportive" concepts for further 
analytical purposes.
The three remaining concepts, WAGE AND PRICE 
CONTROLS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, and RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS 
were not so highly correlated as the two previous groupings
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The only relationship of importance was negative, but 
statistically significant at the .01 level, and occurred 
between the concepts RIGHT-TQ-WORK LAWS and WAGE AND PRICE 
CONTROLS. Based on this relationship and their obvious 
obligatory connotations, the remaining three concepts were 
labeled and classified as "legal" concepts. In summary, 
for purposes of analysis the eight concepts of the semantic 










WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
Figure 3-1 was developed using the means of all
scales by type of concept. It depicts in two-dimensional
semantic space the clustering of concepts as classified
above. The actual mean scores by dimension are:




It is evident that those concepts labeled "legal" received
generally negative responses, while "union-supportive" and
55
"management-supportive" concepts were regarded more favor­
ably, with the latter enjoying the more positive response.
Statistical analysis of the data by type of con­
cept was then performed to determine what relationship(s), 
if any, exists between educational degrees (Law, Economics, 
and "other") and responses by type of concept as classified 
above. The results of the test for interaction are pre­
sented with the testing of each appropriate hypothesis.
Statistical testing of the first hypothesis
follows.
FIGURE 3-1 
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Analysis of the Semantic Differential 
for Lawyer and Economist Arbitrators
The arbitral decision-making model developed in
Chapter I suggests that the personal values and attitudes
of professional labor arbitrators may influence arbitration
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decisions. The following hypothesis was designed to test 
the idea that the values and attitudes of lawyer-arbitrators 
and economist-arbitrators may be dependent upon their educa­
tional backgrounds and may differ as a result. Testing of 
this hypothesis should contribute toward resolution of the 
issue.
Hypothesis 1: Lawyer-arbitrators have dif­
ferent attitudes about certain 
cognitive objects than do 
economist-arbitrators.
The multiple analysis of variance technique was 
the first statistical test to which the semantic differen­
tial data were subjected. It yielded the information con­
tained in Table 3-1, indicating significant differences in 
arbitrator responses by degree for the following four con­
cepts: RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, ECO­
NOMIC EFFICIENCY, and UNION. PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL 
DECISION-MAKING AREAS.
Figure 3-2 demonstrates graphically the relation­
ships of the four concepts with significantly different 
responses by degree, according to their evaluative dimen­
sions. One may observe that economists always adopted a 
more extreme position, whether positive or negative, than 
did lawyers or "others." It appears that economists had 
much stronger convictions about these four concepts than 
did lawyers or "others." Note also the definitive ranking 
of the concepts, with RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS occupying the lower 
level and the concepts COMPULSORY ARBITRATION and UNION
FIGURE 3-2



















Legend: E = Economic Efficiency
P = Union Penetration of Managerial 
Decision-Making Areas
C = Compulsory Arbitration (Private 
Sector)
R = Right-to-Work Laws
PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS next in 
ascending order. The concept given the most credence and 
occupying the highest level in the ranking is ECONOMIC 
EFFICIENCY. This particular finding seems to support the 
observation by Gross that, " . . .  the arbitrator's reason­
ing and decisions reflect dominant social values, in par-
2ticular, the priority of economic efficiency." (emphasis 
added) There seems to be little doubt that the semantic 
differential test was successful in identifying the exist­
ence of significant differences in the meanings attached 
to the concepts by lawyer-arbitrators and economist- 
arbitrators, as well as establishing priorities among con­
cepts. The next step was to isolate those concepts which 
were significantly different for lawyer-arbitrators and 
economist-arbitrators. The "t" test was used to accomplish 
this purpose and the total results of this test by degree 
are presented in Table 3-3.
Test for Differences 
As indicated in Table 3-3, the concepts which 
showed significant differences between lawyer-arbitrators 
and economist-arbitrators are: RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COM­
PULSORY ARBITRATION, and UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL 
DECISION-MAKING AREAS. The concept RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
2James A. Gross, "Value Judgments m  the Deci­
sions of Labor Arbitrators," Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, Vol. 21 (No. 1), p. 55.
TABLE 3-3
Means of Concepts and Significant Differences in 
Connotative Meanings of Concepts by Degree
WE WP LE LP RE RP CE CP UE UP EE EP ME MP PE PP






5.43 4.09 5.41 4.28 5.45 4.30 **4.26
(1)
3.93










4.33 5.10 4.07 4.71 4.22
Others 3.80 3.85 5.52 4.10 4.24 **3.70
(2)
4.42 3.75 5.18 4.00 5.05 4.04 5.36 4.20 4.56 4.09
*Level of Significance = .05 
**Level of Significance = .01 
"t" Test Relationships of Significance:
(1) = Law and Economics
(2) = Law and Others
(3) = Economics and Others
invo
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has a "t" score of 3.34 (for potency scales) which was 
significantly different at the .05 level. COMPULSORY 
ARBITRATION was significantly different at the .01 level 
along both dimensions, evaluative and potency, with "t" 
scores of 4.78 and 3.46, respectively. The concept UNION 
PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS had a "t" 
score of 4.26 (for evaluative scales) which was signifi­
cantly different at the .01 level.
The semantic profiles offered in Exhibits 3-1 
through 3-8 illustrate the relationships of individual 
responses to the bipolar adjective scales for economist- 
arbitrators and lawyer-arbitrators. The following observa­
tions may be noted with a glance at the semantic profiles.
For the concept RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, which was statisti­
cally significantly different, economist-arbitrators held 
a conclusively more negative viewpoint than the slightly 
negative, sometimes neutral, position occupied by lawyer-
3arbitrators.
The widest separation of viewpoints occurred with 
the statistically significant concept of COMPULSORY ARBI­
TRATION (Private Sector), as seen in Exhibit 3-4. Whereas 
economist-arbitrators are decidedly opposed to the concept,
3The bipolar adjectives of the semantic differen­
tial are numerically scaled "1" through "7." The neutral 
position is considered to be "4." Any value less than "4" 
is considered to represent negative viewpoints. Any value 


















































































































































Legend: -----  Lawyers
  Economists
lawyer-arbitrators are generally supportive of the idea of 
compulsory arbitration for the private sector, rating it as 
rather fair, modestly valuable, and important.
The positions are reversed for the final two 
concepts of statistical significance, with economist- 
arbitrators expressing more positive viewpoints than the 
lawyer-arbitrators. The concept ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, 
illustrated in Exhibit 3-6, enjoys great favor and is well- 
supported by both groups. It is not surprising that econo­
mists would express the more positive commitment since 
economic efficiency is a cornerstone of economic theory.
The concept UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING 
AREAS (Exhibit 3-8) is viewed by lawyer-arbitrators as 
rather neutral to negative, whereas economist-arbitrators 
judge this concept as neutral to positive.
The next section will examine the relationship(s) 
if any, between degree and the concepts as they appear in 
clusters.
Test for Interactions
Having recognized the clusters existing among 
the eight concepts and having classified them accordingly, 
the next step is to determine what relationship(s), if any, 
occurs between the concepts by type of cluster and degree. 
The nature of the question becomes whether degree affects 
response by type of concept.
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An analysis of variance was performed on the 
data and the results are recorded below in Table 3-4.
TABLE 3-4
Analysis of Variance for Degree, Type of Concept,
and Interactions
Source d.f s. s m. s F-ratio
Regression 8 98.34 12.19 36.67**
Degree 2 3.32 1.66 4.95**
Type 2 86.92 43.46 129.60**
Degree * Type 4 8.14 2.07 6.07**
Error 445 149.22 .33
**Level of Significance = .01
As indicated above, the degree held, Law, Eco­
nomics, or other, was statistically significant at the .01 
level. (Analysis presented earlier in this chapter, of 
course, arrived generally at the same results, showing 
significant differences by degree for four of the eight 
concepts. Refer to Table 3-1.)
Attention at this point is turned to the results 
contained in Table 3-4 concerning the concepts by type and 
the interactions of degree and type of concept. Type of 
concept was found to be significant, at the .01 level.
This substantiates the classification of concepts into 
groups and establishes the difference in connotative mean­
ings assigned to each concept by type: union-supportive,
management-supportive, and legal. It is clear that the
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concepts as distributed among the three clusters received 
responses by labor arbitrators which differentiated their 
meanings accordingly.
The original question now can be treated. Does 
degree affect response by type of concept? The interaction 
of degree and type of concept is statistically significant 
at the .01 level, according to the information in Table 3-4. 
It can be seen that degree by type of concept has an F-ratio 
of 6.07 which is significant at the .01 level. Thus, the 
question is answered affirmatively. Having established 
the existence of the relationship between degree and type 
of concept, it is appropriate to examine the nature of the 
relationship.
Table 3-5 contains the mean scores for all scales 
by type of concept for each degree classification.
TABLE 3-5
Total Mean Scores for All Bipolar Scales 
by Degree and Type of Concept
Degree Union-supportive Management-support ive Legal
Law 4.56 4.86 4.03
Economics 4.68 4.78 3.45
Other 4.63 4.75 3.14
It is readily apparent that the concepts classified as 
legal received much lower scores from all respondent arbi­
trators than did either the management-supportive or
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union-supportive concepts. Generally, both management- 
supportive and union-supportive concepts received favorably 
high scores. Other relationships become more apparent with 
a graphic illustration of the means as presented in Figure 
3-3. (As in Table 3-5, the means of degree classification 
"other" is treated in Figure 3-3. Although not concerned 
with testing the present hypothesis, this information is 
conducive to understanding degree relationships and is 
necessary in testing the following two hypotheses. Thus, 






Economists had the widest separations among means while 
lawyers appear to have the narrowest separations among

















means. The means of "others" generally fall between the 
means of lawyers and economists. Thus, all degree classi­
fications considered, the means of lawyers and economists 
are the most widely divergent. The economist-arbitrators' 
mean score of 3.45 on the legal concepts was very low rela 
tive to the rather neutral score of 4.03 attributed to the 
same concepts by lawyer-arbitrators. The responses of 
"other" degrees to the legal concepts, while falling be­
tween the lawyers and economists, were somewhat negative 
with a mean score of 3.84. Two preliminary observations 
seem to be that, (1 ) the legal concepts were rated much 
lower than the other classifications by all arbitrators, 
and (2) the divergence in the mean scores of lawyer- 
arbitrators and economist-arbitrators is greater than 
other combinations of degrees.
The mean scores contained in Table 3-5 yield 
still other relationships when viewed with the additional 
perspective of Figure 3-4. Figure 3-4 represents graph­
ically the relationships by degree and type of concept 
according to the mean scores for all bipolar scales used 
to judge the concepts of the semantic differential test. 
Actually, the means of the evaluative scales demonstrated 
wider separations, as seen in Figure 3-4 (A), whereas the 
narrower differences for the means of the potency scales 
tended to reduce the differences of the total mean scores, 
as seen in Figure 3-4 (C). However, the interactions of
FIGURE 3-4
Interactions by Degree and Type of Concept for Evaluative and Potency
Scales and the Total Means
A B C  




















total mean scores as depicted in Figure 3-4 (B) remained 
unaltered. This graphical representation of mean scores 
suggests the nature of the interactions which exist between 
degree (Law and Economics) and type of concept. As ob­
served, these interactions are significant at the .01 level
Of particular importance, as shown in Figure 3-4, 
is the reversal of high and low mean scores of lawyer- 
arbitrators and economist-arbitrators for union-supportive 
concepts and management-supportive concepts. While eco­
nomists rated union-supportive concepts high with a mean 
score of 4.68, lawyers rated union-supportive concepts 
lower with a mean score of 4.56. On the management- 
supportive concepts, the lawyers' mean score of 4.86 was 
higher than the economists' mean score of 4.78 which repre­
sents a reversal in relative positions for union and 
management-supportive concepts for lawyer-arbitrators and 
economist-arbitrators.
The difference in the mean scores for lawyers 
(4.03) and economists (3.45) on the legal-type concepts 
was statistically significant at the .01 level, such dif­
ference being statistically identified by a "t" score of 
5.13. No other significant differences by type of concept 
were discernable.
The hypothesis being tested suggests the exist­
ence of differences in attitudes for lawyer-arbitrators 
and economist-arbitrators. Three of the eight concepts of
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the semantic differential test were significantly different 
on this basis, thus justifying acceptance of the present 
hypothesis.
Analysis of the Semantic Differential 
for Lawyer and "Other" Arbitrators
The second hypothesis is concerned with the rela­
tionship between those labor arbitrators who are lawyers 
and those who are classified as "other." More specifically, 
the second hypothesis as stated below predicts the existence 
of differences in responses for lawyers and "others."
Hypothesis 2: Lawyer-arbitrators have dif­
ferent attitudes about certain 
cognitive objects than do arbi­
trators classified as "Other."
Test for Differences
It may be noted by reference to Table 3-3 that 
the only concept demonstrating a statistically significant 
difference for lawyers and "others" is RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS 
(potency scales) which has a "t" score of 3.70, which is 
significant at the .01 level.
The most obvious interpretation is that the 
responses of these two groups, lawyers and "others," were 
not meaningfully different. With the exception of the 
concept RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS the meanings attributed to the 
concepts were quite similar, as inspection of Exhibits 3-9 






































































































































































Legend: -----  Lawyers
-----  Others
Test for Interactions
Figure 3-5 demonstrates graphically the nature 
of the interactions by type of concept for lawyers and 
"others." Although no statistically significant differ­
ences were found in their responses to the semantic dif­
ferential, the opinions of lawyer-arbitrators and "other"- 
arbitrators were reversed for the management-supportive and 
union-supportive concepts. The means of Table 3-5 illus­
trate the interaction. While lawyer-arbitrators rated 
management-supportive concepts high with a mean score of 
4.86, "other"-arbitrators rated the same concepts below this 
with a mean score of 4.75. For the union-supportive con­
cepts the means for lawyer-arbitrators was 4.56, which is 
lower than the means of 4.63 for "other"-arbitrators. Note, 
also, that the legal concepts followed the same relative 
pattern as the management concepts for lawyer-arbitrators 
and "other"-arbitrators, receiving higher ratings from the 
lawyer-arbitrators.
The hypothesis being tested suggests the exist­
ence of differences in attitudes for lawyer-arbitrators and 
"other"-arbitrators. Only one of the eight concepts of the 
semantic differential test was significantly different on 
this basis. Therefore, the present hypothesis is rejected.
Consideration will next be given to the final 
hypothesis concerning educational degree.
FIGURE 3-5
Interactions by Degree and Type of Concept for Evaluative and Potency
Scales and Total Means
A B C















Analysis of the Semantic Differential for 
Economist and "Other" Arbitrators
The third and final hypothesis relative to educa­
tion concerns the relationship between those labor arbi­
trators who are economists and those who are classified as 
"other." Stated as follows, the third hypothesis predicts 
differences in the responses to the semantic differential 
of economists and "others."
Hypothesis 3: Economist-arbitrators have
different attitudes about 
certain cognitive objects 
than do arbitrators classi­
fied as "Other."
Test for Differences
Reference to Table 3-3 will indicate that the 
responses to three concepts are statistically significantly 
different. The concept RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS was significantly 
different along both dimensions, evaluative and potency.
The evaluative scales had a "t" score of 2.96 which was 
significant at the .01 level, while the potency scales had 
a "t" score of 2.98 which was significant at the .05 level.
Also judged to be significantly different were 
the responses of economists and "other"-arbitrators to 
the concept COMPULSORY ARBITRATION. Both dimensions were 
significant, with the evaluative scales having a "t" score 
of 3.37, significant at the .05 level, and the potency 
scales with a "t" score of 2.85, significant at the .01 
level.
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The concept ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY is statistically 
significantly different along the evaluative dimension with 
a "t" score of 5.64, which is significant at the .05 level.
A glance at the visual profiles contained in 
Exhibits 3-17 through 3-24 reveals that the economists have 
taken the more extreme positions. Economists have estab­
lished definitely negative viewpoints toward the concepts 
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS and COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private 
Sector), while "others" appear to be only slightly negative 
to neutral on both concepts. While both groups supported 
the concept ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, the economists were de­
cidedly more supportive.
Test for Interactions
Figure 3-6 illustrates the nature of the inter­
actions for economist-arbitrators and "other"-arbitrators.
The difference in the mean scores for economists(3.45) and 
"others" (3.84) on the legal-type concepts was statis­
tically significant at the .01 level, being statistically 
represented by a "t" score of 3.45. No other significant 
differences by type of concept were found.
As with the two previous hypotheses, there are 
reversals of rankings between types of concepts. However, 
the present reversals are not between management-supportive 
and union-supportive concepts, as was the case previously. 
Economist-arbitrators rate both management-supportive and 
union-supportive concepts above "other"-arbitrators by
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EXHIBIT 3-17 





































































































































Interactions by Degree and Type of Concept for Evaluative and Potency
Scales and Total Means
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slight margins. The reversal occurs with the legal con­
cepts where economist-arbitrators rate those concepts 
significantly lower than do "other"-arbitrators. As ob­
served earlier, economists have, once again, taken the 
more extreme position.
The hypothesis being tested suggests the exist­
ence of differences in attitudes for economist-arbitrators 
and "other"-arbitrators. Three of the eight concepts of 
the semantic differential test were significantly different 
on this basis, thus justifying acceptance of the present 
hypothesis.
Conclusions
The literature of labor arbitration suggests that 
the different educational backgrounds of professional labor 
arbitrators may influence arbitral decisions. The hypoth­
eses tested in this chapter were designed to investigate 
the differences alleged to exist along educational lines. 
Thus, the labor arbitrator respondents of this study were 
classified according to educational backgrounds as either 
lawyer, economist, or "other." The following three hypoth­
eses were formulated and have been tested.
H.: Lawyer-arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cognitive 
objects than do economist-arbitrators.
H2 : Lawyer-arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cognitive 
objects than do arbitrators classi­
fied as "Other."
H,: Economist-arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cognitive 
objects than do arbitrators classified 
as "Other."
Generally, the three hypotheses concerned with 
educational differences were well-supported by analysis of 
the data generated by the semantic differential test. The 
type of degree held by labor arbitrator respondents, Legal, 
Economics, or "other," was found to be statistically sig­
nificant for four of the eight concepts utilized in the 
semantic differential test. The four concepts were: 
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector) 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, and UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL 
DECISION-MAKING AREAS. It is the contention of this re­
searcher that the wide range of attitudinal orientations 
to these concepts may be manifested in the decisions of 
labor arbitrators. To the extent that these concepts are 
operative in the decision-making process, differences in 
decisions may result due to the differences in the educa­
tional backgrounds of the labor arbitrators.
More specifically, the first hypothesis, which 
suggested differences between lawyer-arbitrators and 
economist-arbitrators, was supported by the existence of 
statistically significant differences for the following 
three concepts: RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
(Private Sector), and UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL 
DECISION-MAKING AREAS. Clearly, the existence of these 
differences supports the acceptance of Hypothesis 1.
The second hypothesis, concerning lawyers and 
"others," was not so well-supported as the initial hypoth­
esis. Only one concept, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, was found to 
demonstrate statistically significant differences. This 
seems to indicate that lawyer-arbitrators and "other"- 
arbitrators are fairly similar in their attitudes toward 
the concepts of the semantic differential test. Thus, the 
second hypothesis is rejected.
The third hypothesis of this study provides 
additional insight into the role of educational backgrounds 
of labor arbitrators. It concerns the differences in atti­
tudes between economist-arbitrators and "other"-arbitrators 
As with the first hypothesis, three concepts were found to 
be statistically significantly different: RIGHT-TO-WORK
LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector), and ECONOMIC 
EFFICIENCY. As noted earlier in Chapter III, the economist 
arbitrators have yielded a consistently more extreme posi­
tion toward the concepts than either lawyer or "others."
It is probably this condition which precipitated support 
of the first hypothesis as well as the acceptance of this 
third hypothesis.
Thus, the existence of differences due to educa­
tional background has been postulated, tested, and found to 
exist in two of the three proposed relationships. Accord­
ing to this study, it does make a difference whether the 
labor-arbitrator is a lawyer-arbitrator or an economist- 
arbitrator.
CHAPTER IV
RELATIONSHIP OF AGE TO THE SEMANTIC 
DIFFERENTIAL TEST
The ages of labor arbitrators in the United 
States are characterized by the following two facts:
(1) the average age is approximately 60, and (2 ) younger • 
arbitrators entering the field have significantly differ­
ing backgrounds in terms of education and experience.^
The first implication drawn from these facts is that as 
the supply of labor arbitrators with War Labor Board 
experience diminishes, the composition of professional 
labor arbitrators will have different characteristics in 
terms of age, education, and experience. For example, in 
a recent study it was found that 85.7 percent of labor 
arbitrators "under 50" are lawyers. Continuation of such 
a trend would sharply alter the present composition where 
lawyers comprise approximately one-half the population of 
labor arbitrators in the United States.
^See Brian L. King, "Some Aspects of the Active 
Labor Arbitrator," Personnel Journal (February, 1971), 
pp. 115-123.
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Both management and labor prefer older, experi-
2enced, and established labor arbitrators. The following 
hypothesis is designed to test the idea that these pref­
erences may be quantitatively justifiable, in terms of 
differences in the personal value systems of young and 
older labor arbitrators. If so, then there may be implica 
tions to be drawn in terms of the changing age composition 
of labor arbitrators.
Hypothesis 4: Younger arbitrators have
different attitudes about 
certain cognitive objects 
than older arbitrators.
Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified by
age and distributed as follows:
Age Number Percent
less than 50 years 28 18.42
50 - 60 years 57 37.50
over 60 years 67 44.08
152 100.00%
This sample reflects the fact that, as a group, labor arbi 
trators tend to be older, even approaching retirement age. 
The following section will test differences between age 
groups.
oBrian L. King, "Management and Union Attitudes 
Affecting the Employment of Inexperienced Labor Arbitra­
tors," Labor Law Journal (January, 1971) , p. 23.
Test for Differences
As indicated in Table 3-1, the only concept to 
demonstrate a statistically significant difference between 
age groups was UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION­
MAKING AREAS. This concept was significant along both 
dimensions, evaluative and potency, at the .05 level. As 
before, this determination was made through the analysis 
of variance technique for the three age classifications. 
And, as before, the Ht" test was used to isolate the paired 
classifications with significant differences. The mean 
scores used to accomplish the "t" test are given below: 
Group Age P (E) P (P)
1 less than 50 years 4.82 4.17
2 5 0 - 6 0  years 4.52 4.14
3 over 60 years 4.16 3.89
A significant difference was found to exist be­
tween those labor arbitrators who were less than 50 years 
of age and those who were over 60 years of age for the 
concept UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING 
AREAS (evaluative scales). The "t" score of 3.18 is sig­
nificant at the .01 level. Also, those labor arbitrators 
over 60 years of age differed significantly with the age 
group 50-60 years of age. The "t" score of 2.21 was sig­
nificant at the .05 level, for the same concept. The 
greater the age difference, the more significant the dif­
ference.
The age groups discussed above were also found 
to have significant differences for the concept UNION
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PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS (potency 
scales). The over 60 age group was found to differ sig­
nificantly from the less than 50 group as well as the 
50-60 group, with "t" scores of 2.17 and 2.47, respectively, 
each at the .05 level of significance.
A glance at Exhibit 4-8 will demonstrate visually 
the differences discussed in the previous two paragraphs.
The over 60 age group is decidedly negative in their 
reactions to the concept UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL 
DECISION-MAKING AREAS, while the younger labor arbitrators 
are neutral to positive in their responses. And, although 
the concept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS (Exhibit 4-7) did not reveal 
a statistically significant difference for the age varia­
ble, it is interesting to note that the relative positions 
of the younger arbitrators and older arbitrators are re­
versed from the reactions to the concept UNION PENETRATION 
OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS. The older arbitrators 
demonstrate greater support for the concept MANAGEMENT 
RIGHTS than the younger arbitrators. This reversal is 
apparently consistent since the two concepts are, to a great 
extent, mutually exclusive.
Test for Interactions
A test for interaction between the variable age 
and concepts, as classified in Chapter III, into management- 
supportive, labor-supportive, and legal concepts was
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EXHIBIT 4-1 
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EXHIBIT 4-8
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performed in an effort to identify any further relation­
ships. None of statistical significance were found.
Conclusion
The projected change in the age composition of 
professional labor arbitrators in the United States implies 
a possible change in value systems of future arbitrators.
This inference served as the rationale for investigating . 
any possible differences in values between younger and 
older labor arbitrators as they exist today. This investi- 
tation was accomplished by testing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Younger arbitrators have
difference attitudes about 
certain cognitive objects 
than older arbitrators.
The hypothesis is not well-supported by the data 
"analysis. Only one concept, UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL 
DECISION-MAKING AREAS, was found to be significantly dif­
ferent between age groups. Where this occurred, it seemed 
to result from the more extreme position taken by those 
labor arbitrators over 60 years of age. It was also ob­
served that this older group gave more support to the con­
cept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS which to a degree is the mirror 
concept of UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING 
AREAS. From this, it may be suggested that the older arbi­
trators may be more management-supportive than the younger 
labor arbitrators.
However, this hypothesis is rejected due to lack 
of support.
CHAPTER V
RELATIONSHIP OF EXPERIENCE TO THE 
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL TEST
It was noted in Chapter I that the one indispen­
sable qualification for becoming a labor arbitrator is 
mutual acceptance by management and labor. Such acceptance 
seems to be almost solely a function of actual arbitral 
experience. In fact, those who are established, experienced 
labor arbitrators have been accorded special status in being 
referenced as " m a i n l i n e r s . A c c o r d i n g to Prasow, " . . .  
the line of demarcation between a fringe arbitrator and a 
mainliner. . . occurs when the losing party begins to scru­
tinize the arbitrator's opinion not seeking where the arbi­
trator had erred, but. . . to find out where he (the party)
2was wrong." There is no doubt that management and labor
3prefer the services of experienced arbitrators. Davey
"^Paul Prasow and Edward Peters, Arbitration and 
Collective Bargaining: Conflict Resolution in Labor Rela­
tions (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1970),
pp. 284-293.
2Ibid., p. 285.
3See William J. Kilber, "The FMCS and Arbitration: 
Problems and Prospects," Monthly Labor Review (April, 1971), 
p. 40? and Brian L. King, "Some Aspects of the Active Labor
Arbitrator," Personnel Journal (February, 1971), pp. 115- 123.
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contends that a key challenge for the future is . . how 
to cope effectively with the problem of a short supply of 
competent, experienced/ and acceptable arbitrators in the 
face of an increasing demand for the services of 'informed 
neutrals'. . . . (The extreme difficulty in gaining ac­
ceptability through experience was noted earlier.)
Supposedly, the desire for experienced labor arbi 
trators is based primarily on a feeling held by the parties 
that the decisions of experienced arbitrators are more "pre 
dictable" than would be the decisions of inexperienced arbi 
trators. Fleming's research in the area does not support 
this thesis, and he asserts, " . . .  they (the parties)
5ought not be so concerned about trying new arbitrators." 
Further, Fleming suggests that, . . if the management 
prerogative question is involved, it is possible to ascer­
tain an individual arbitrator's views (emphasis added) on 
that subject from published decisions."® The implication 
is that experienced labor arbitrators may hold different 
views about significant concepts which may influence their 
decisions.
4Harold W. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bar­
gaining (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 159.
5R. W. Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process 
(Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1965)
p. 104.
6Ibid., p. 104.
The objective of this chapter is to determine 
whether the arbitrator respondents to this study hold dif­
ferent views of specific concepts, such as MANAGEMENT 
RIGHTS as suggested above, and whether the differences 
are related statistically to direct experience as a labor 
arbitrator. In addition, non-arbitral experience, such as 
federal employment and union membership experience will 
receive consideration.
Analysis of Direct Labor Arbitration Experience
For purposes of this study, direct labor arbi­
tration experience was "measured" by: (1) years of experi
ence as a labor arbitrator, (2) actual number of arbitral 
decisions rendered, and (3) whether the arbitrator respond 
dent considers himself (or herself) to be employed on a 
full-time or part-time basis. Three individual hypotheses 
have been designed to test each measure of direct arbitra­
tion experience against the data yielded by the semantic 
differential test.
Experience in Terms of Years as an Arbitrator
The first hypothesis to test direct arbitration
experience concerns experience in terms of years and is
stated below:
Hypothesis 5: More experienced arbitrators,
in terms of years, have dif­
ferent attitudes about certain 
cognitive objects than less 
experienced arbitrators.
Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified accord 
ing to years as a labor arbitrator and distributed as 
follows:
Years Number Percent
less than 5 years 8 5.26
5 - 3 0  years 84 55.26
more than 30 years 60 39.48
152 100.00%
The sample distribution reflects the proposition 
that the field of labor arbitration is composed of heavily- 
experienced professionals. Arbitrators with less than five 
years' experience comprise 5.26 percent of the sample while 
the remaining 94.74 have more than five years' experience. 
Almost 40 percent of the sample have served as labor arbi­
trators for more than 30 years and remain active as arbi­
trators. The classification with the greatest representa­
tion is the middle group with 5-30 years' experience and 
55.26 percent of the sample. Should differences exist on 
the basis of years of experience, the present sample is 
adequately distributed to reveal such differences. The 
next step is to test the hypothesis.
Test for Differences
The first measure of direct arbitration experi­
ence to be analyzed is years as an active labor arbitrator. 
The concept COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (potency scales) is the 
single concept to be judged statistically significantly
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different for experience in terms of years. The level of
significance is .05, as reflected in Table 3-1. Again, it
is necessary to use the "t" test to discover where the
actual significant differences exist. The mean scores used
for this purpose are given below:
Experience C (P) C (E)
less than 5 years 3.97 5.37
5 - 3 0  years 3.15 4.22
more than 30 years 3.37 4.11
The statistically significant difference was 
found to exist between those labor arbitrators with less 
than five years of arbitral experience and those with 5-30 
years of arbitral experience. It appears that the less 
experienced group responded neutrally to the concept with 
a mean score of 3.97, while the 5-30 year group was decid­
edly negative with a mean score of 3.15.
Considering the fact that the younger arbitrators 
coming into the field tend to be lawyers and the lawyers 
expressed favorable responses to COMPULSORY ARBITRATION as 
opposed to economists (refer to Chapter III), this finding 
is consistent with the findings of Chapter III for this 
concept. (That is, the younger, less experienced lawyer- 
arbitrators tend to support the idea of compulsory arbitra­
tion. )
Exhibit 5-1 presents a visual observation of the 
relative responses to the concept COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, 
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Test for Interactions
Labor arbitration experience as measured by 
years was then tested for possible interaction with the 
concepts of the semantic differential test as classified 
into management-supportive, labor-supportive, and legal 
concepts according to Chapter III. No such interactions 
were found to exist.
The present hypothesis is not supported by the 
analysis of the responses to the semantic differential 
test, as only one concept was found to be statistically 
significantly different due to arbitral experience in 
terms of years.
Experience in Terms of Numbers of 
Arbitration Cases Decided
The next measure of direct arbitral experience, 
and probably the one most relied upon by labor and manage­
ment, is the number of arbitration cases actually decided 
by the respondent arbitrators. The following hypothesis 
was developed to test this measurement of labor arbitration 
experience:
Hypothesis 6 : More experienced arbitrators,
in terms of decisions, have 
different attitudes about cer­
tain cognitive objects than 
less experienced arbitrators.
Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified ac­
cording to actual numbers of arbitration decisions rendered 
and distributed as follows:
No. of Decisions Number Percent
less than 50 21 13.82
51 - 200 53 34.86
more than 200 78 51.32
152 100.00%
As with experience measured in terms of years, 
the sample distribution for number of decisions reflects 
the view that labor arbitrators as a group are very experi­
enced professionals. More than one-half of the respondent 
arbitrators have rendered in excess of 200 arbitral deci­
sions, and more than 86 percent have decided 50 or more 
cases. Only 13.82 percent indicate experience of fewer 
than 50 cases. The composition of this sample should re­
veal any significant differences which may exist for experi 
ence as measured by numbers of arbitral decisions.
Test for Differences
The present hypothesis to be tested asserts that 
statistically significant differences exist for labor arbi­
trators and such differences depend upon the numbers of 
arbitration cases decided by the sample respondents. Ac­
cording to the analysis of variance performed on the data, 
no such relationship exists.
Test for Interactions
No interaction was found to exist between experi­
ence in terms of decisions and type of concept.
Experience as a Full-Time or Part-Time Arbitrator
Exclusive of those labor arbitrators ". . . o n
the staffs of state agencies such as those in New York and
Massachusetts," there are only " . . .  perhaps 30 to 50 
7. . . ." full-time labor arbitrators in the United States.
The following hypothesis deals with the amount of time the
labor arbitrator devotes to his (or her) arbitration work.
Hypothesis 7: Part-time arbitrators have
different attitudes about 
certain cognitive objects 
than full-time arbitrators.
Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified ac­
cording to whether they considered themselves to be engaged 
in labor arbitration on a full-time or part-time basis and 





Comparing the sample size of full-time arbitra­
tors to the estimate of Professor Davey, above, it appears 
that (1) the full-time arbitrators are over-represented,
7Davey, 0£. cit., p. 180.
and (2) that perhaps the reason is a sizable number of the 
full-time respondents are employed by state agencies. 
Nevertheless, the next step is to test the hypothesis.
Test for Differences
Two concepts, THE LABOR MOVEMENT and RIGHT-TO- 
WORK LAWS, were found to be statistically significant as 
to whether the respondent arbitrators considered themselves 
to be engaged on a part-time or full-time basis. THE LABOR 
MOVEMENT was significant along the potency dimension with 
an F value of 6 .86, significant at the .01 level (refer to 
Table 3-1). The concept of RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS was found to 
be statistically significant along the evaluative dimension 
with an F value of 4.31, significant at the .05 level.
Exhibits 5-2 and 5-3 illustrate the semantic 
profiles of full-time and part-time labor arbitrators. It 
appears that both groups felt very positive about THE LABOR 
MOVEMENT and quite negative about the concept RIGHT-TO-WORK 
LAWS. The important relationship to note is that full-time 
labor arbitrators assumed the extreme position for each 
concept, indicating that as a group they tended to have 
stronger feelings about both concepts.
Test for Interactions
No interactions were found to exist between the 
amount of time, part-time or full-time, and the concepts of 
the semantic differential test as classified into 
































The hypothesis being tested suggests that full­
time labor arbitrators have different attitudes than part- 
time arbitrators. Only two concepts of the semantic 
differential test were found to be significantly different 
in support of the present hypothesis. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is rejected.
Results for Direct Labor Arbitration Experience
As mentioned previously, the only criteria for 
success as a labor arbitrator is acceptance by management 
and labor. Acceptance is largely a function of direct 
experience as a labor arbitrator. The increasing shortage 
of acceptable labor arbitrators raises a question as to the 
real significance of experience to the arbitrator. More 
specifically, do significant differences exist between the 
less experienced and more experienced labor arbitrators?
Three measures of direct labor arbitration experience were 
incorporated into three hypotheses designed to be tested for 
differences between less experienced and more experienced 
arbitrators. The results of such testing were definitely 
negative for each of the three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 5 concerned direct labor arbitration 
experience in terms of years of experience as an arbitrator. 
Only one concept, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, was found to be 
statistically significant. This hypothesis is rejected.
Hypothesis 6 concerned direct labor arbitration 
experience in terms of numbers of arbitration decisions
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previously rendered. Although acceptance by the parties 
depends largely on the numbers of arbitral decisions ren­
dered, no significant difference was found to exist for any 
concept of the semantic differential test between relatively 
inexperienced and heavily experienced labor arbitrators.
(Note by reference to Table 3-1 that this important varia­
ble was the only one where no statistical significance 
existed for any of the eight concepts.) Therefore, Hypoth­
esis 6 is resolutely rejected.
Hypothesis 7 concerned direct labor arbitration 
experience in terms of time devoted to arbitration work, 
either full-time or part-time. Two concepts were found to 
be statistically significantly different: THE LABOR MOVE­
MENT and RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS. This final hypothesis con­
cerning the significance of direct labor arbitration experi­
ence is rejected.
In the next section non-arbitration experiences 
will be tested for significant differences in responses to 
the semantic differential data.
Analysis of Non-Arbitration Experience 
As well as being concerned with the respondents' 
direct labor arbitration experience, this study seeks to 
examine other aspects of experience not directly related 
to arbitral experience. For this purpose, non-arbitration 
experience is analyzed in terms of: (1) previous work
experience with the United States Department of Labor, the
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NLRB, WLB, or other government agencies concerned with the 
labor sector, (2) previous employment as a manager in a 
firm, (3) labor union membership experience, (4) place of 
residence (U.S. divided into four regions: North, East,
South, West), and (5) membership in The National Academy 
of Arbitrators. Five individual hypotheses have been 
designed to test each measure of non-arbitration experience 
against the data yielded by the semantic differential test.
The reason for this researcher's interest in non- 
arbitration experience is best illustrated by the following 
statement of Davey. "They (the parties) also rarely accept 
experienced labor relations prospects as arbitrators if the 
experience of the would-be arbitrator was gained on either
gthe management or the union side of the bargaining table."
The implication of this statement is that as a result of 
previous experience the parties "feel" that the "would-be 
arbitrator" may have internalized the values espoused by 
either management or labor and may, therefore, be precondi­
tioned to support the views of one party against the other, 
and could not act in an entirely "objective" and "impar­
tial" manner. This study is partially an attempt to iden­
tify the differences, if any, in attitudes of labor arbi­
trators attributable to their non-arbitration experience. 
Toward this end the first hypothesis dealing with non­
arbitration experience will now be tested.
gDavey, op. cit., p. 181.
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Experience in Terms of Federal Employment
The following hypothesis suggests that experience 
as a federal employee may influence the attitudes of labor
V
arbitrators as reflected by results of the semantic dif­
ferential test.
Hypothesis 8 : Arbitrators who have worked
for a federal labor agency 
have different attitudes about 
certain cognitive objects than 
those who have not been em­
ployed by a federal labor agency.
Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified ac­
cording to whether or not they had been employed by a 
federal government agency concerned with the labor sector, 
such as The United States Department of Labor, the NLRB, 
or the WLB. Classification and distribution of the respond­






The sample distribution is indicative of ". . . 
how most of the mainline arbitrators got on the ground 
floor of private arbitration after the War (WW II) was 
over" by obtaining labor-relations experience through a 
government agency, normally the War Labor Board (WW II)
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9or the National Labor Relations Board. Over 53 percent of 
the respondents to this study indicated they had such ex­
perience. Is there a difference in attitudes between those 
with such experience and those without such experience as 
measured by the semantic differential test?
Test for Differences
Referring to Table 3-1, it is apparent that the 
following four concepts successfully differentiated those 
respondents with federal agency experience and those with­
out federal experience: THE LABOR MOVEMENT, RIGHT-TO-WORK
LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, and MANAGEMENT RIGHTS.
THE LABOR MOVEMENT (potency scales) was statis­
tically significantly different at the .05 level with an 
F-score of 4.34. The difference in responses to the po­
tency scales may be observed in Exhibit 5-4. Evidently, 
those respondent arbitrators with federal experience view 
THE LABOR MOVEMENT as less imposing or forceful than those 
without federal experience.
The next concept to be found statistically signif­
icantly different is RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS at the .01 level 
of significance for the evaluative scales with an F-score 
of 7.82. As seen in Exhibit 5-5, those arbitrators with 
federal experience held consistently more negative view­
points toward this concept than those without federal
gPrasow, 0£. ext., p. 285.
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experience. However, both were decidedly opposed to this 
concept, except for one instance where those arbitrators 
without federal experience judge the concept as fairly 
important.
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION is found to be statis­
tically significantly different for evaluative scales at 
the .05 level with an F-score of 4.15. Those respondents 
with federal experience are decidedly opposed to the con­
cept of COMPULSORY ARBITRATION while those arbitrator 
respondents without such experience seem to be rather neu­
tral, as visually determined with reference to Exhibit 5-6.
The concept of MANAGEMENT RIGHTS is found to be 
statistically significantly different for evaluative scales 
at the .05 level with an F-score of 3.66. Although both 
groups expressed favorable views toward the concept, those 
with federal experience were not so strong in their views 
as the respondent arbitrators without federal experience, 
as demonstrated visually in Exhibit 5-7.
It may be noted by reference to Exhibits 5-4 
through 5-7 that the responses of respondents with federal 
experience to each concept judged as significantly differ­
ent are generally to the left of the responses by those 
arbitrators without federal experience; among those with 
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Test for Interactions
Non-arbitration experience, as measured in terms 
of federal experience, was tested for possible interaction 
with the concepts of the semantic differential test classi­
fied as management-supportive, union-supportive, and legal 
concepts (see Chapter III). It was found that the concepts 
as classified were differentiated by federal experience at 
the .01 level of significance with an F-score of 14.91. 
Further, interactions were found to exist according to 
federal experience and by type of concept at the .01 level 
with an F-score of 9.04, as may be seen in Table 5-1.
TABLE 5-1
Analysis of Variance for Federal Experience, 
Type of Concept, and Interactions
Source d.f s . s m.s F-ratio
Regression 5 97.91 19.58 58.60**
Fed 1 4.98 4.98 14.91**
Type 2 86.89 43.45 130.01**
Fed * Type 2 6.04 3.02 9.03**
Error 448 149.70 .33
**Level of Significance = .01
The interactions are presented graphically in 
Figure 5-1. The differences in responses for the concepts
classified as legal are much greater than the differences 
for either management-supportive or union-supportive con­
cepts, and probably account for the severity of the
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interaction. It may be noted that no reversals are present 
as there were with education. The information shown in 
Exhibits 5-4 through 5-7 indicates the responses of arbitra­
tors with federal experience. These responses are consist­
ently to the left of arbitrators without federal experience.
As Figure 5-1 shows, the federally-experienced arbitrators 
generally scored below the non-federally experienced arbi­
trators .
The hypothesis being tested suggests that working 
experience with the federal government may serve to influ­
ence the attitudes of those labor arbitrators having had 
such experience. Clearly, four of the eight concepts of 
the semantic differential test were significantly different 
on this basis, and this is adequate support to justify ac­
ceptance of this hypothesis.
Experience in Terms of Managerial Employment
The next hypothesis dealing with non-arbitration 
experience is related to work experience as a manager in a 
firm.
Hypothesis 9: Arbitrators who have held
management positions in private 
firms have different attitudes 
about certain cognitive objects 
than those without such manage­
ment experience.
Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified accord­
ing to whether or not they had been employed as managers
FIGURE 5-1
Interactions by Federal Employment Experience and Type of Concept for 
Evaluative and Potency Scales and Total Means
A B C  
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Although it seems generally accepted that the 
parties prefer not to employ as arbitrators individuals 
with management backgrounds, 46 percent of this sample is 
made up of arbitrators with such management experience.
Does management experience affect the labor arbitrators' 
attitudes as measured by the semantic differential test?
Test for Differences
According to information in Table 3-1, the follow 
ing concepts were found to be statistically significantly 
different for those respondent arbitrators with experience 
as managers and those lacking such experience: UNION LEAD­
ERSHIP and ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY. In addition, the concept 
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS approached the .05 level of significance 
and will receive consideration in the following paragraphs.
statistically significantly different at the .05 level with 
an F-score of 4.32 along the evaluative dimension. It will 
be noted by reference to Figure 5-8 that the attitudes of 
those labor arbitrators with managerial experience were 
more favorably disposed toward the concept UNION LEADERSHIP 
than those arbitrators without such management experience.
The concept UNION LEADERSHIP was found to be
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY was found to be statistically 
significantly different along both dimensions, evaluative 
and potency. The evaluative dimension was found signifi­
cant at the .01 level with an F-score of 7.02, while.the 
potency dimension was found significantly different at the 
.01 level with an F-score of 7.48. The labor arbitrators 
with managerial experience were generally more supportive 
of the concept ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY than those without such 
experience. Evidently, the labor arbitrators experienced 
as managers consider ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY to be more impor­
tant than those without managerial experience.
The concept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS approached the pre­
determined level of significance of .05 for this study with 
an F-score of 3.28, which was found to be significant at the 
.07 level. This finding merits consideration due to the 
importance of the concept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS to the area of 
labor-management relations. Exhibit 5-10 demonstrates the 
greater support given this concept by arbitrators with 
managerial experience as opposed to those without mana­
gerial experience.
It may be noted by reference to Exhibits 5-8 
through 5-10 that labor arbitrators with managerial expe­
rience were more supportive of all significant concepts 
than those arbitrators without management experience.
Test for Interactions
Non-arbitration experience, as determined in 
terms of management experience, was then tested for possi­
ble interaction with the concepts of the semantic differ­
ential test as classified into management-supportive, 
union-supportive, and legal concepts according to Chap­
ter III. It was found that the concepts as classified 
were differentiated by managerial experience at the .05 
level with an F-score of 4.54. (This finding is mainly 
attributable to differences for evaluative scales.) How­
ever, no interactions were found to exist according to 
managerial experience and by type of concept.
The hypothesis being tested indicated that those 
labor arbitrators who have had experience as a manager in 
a firm may have attitudes different than arbitrators with 
no management experience. Two concepts, UNION LEADERSHIP 
and ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, were found to be significantly 
different in support of the present hypothesis. In addi­
tion, the concept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS approached the .05 
acceptable level of significance at the .07 level and, 
therefore, lends some further support to acceptance of the 
hypothesis. Further, it is to be considered that two of 
the three concepts are classified as management-supportive 
concepts and one would suspect that these concepts would 
receive greater support from arbitrators with previous 
management experience as opposed to arbitrators with no 
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Experience as a Labor Union Member 
The next hypothesis concerned with non-arbitration 
experience is related to the respondent arbitrators' expe­
rience or non-experience as a labor union member.
Hypothesis 10: Arbitrators who have held union
membership have different atti­
tudes about certain cognitive 
objects than arbitrators with­
out union membership experience.
Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified accord­
ing to whether or not they had held union membership and 






It has been held that individuals who have been 
labor union members are not generally acceptable by the 
parties as labor arbitrators. Yet, over 36 percent of the 
respondent arbitrators indicated that they had previously 
held membership in a labor union. Does such experience 
influence the labor arbitrators' attitudes as measured by 
the semantic differential test?
Test for Differences
The following two concepts were found to be 
statistically significantly different for respondent
arbitrators who had been union members and those who had 
not: WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS and COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
(Private Sector) .
The concept WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS was found to 
be statistically significantly different at the .01 level 
with an F-score of 6.00 along the evaluative dimension.
The concept COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector) was 
found to be statistically significantly different at the 
.05 level with an F-score of 3.97 along the potency dimen­
sion. Both concepts were generally approved by all respond 
ents without distinction according to union membership 
experience, as seen in Figures 5-11 and 5-12.
Test for Interactions
Non-arbitration experience as measured by pre­
vious union membership experience was then tested for 
possible interaction with the concepts of the semantic 
differential test as classified into management-supportive, 
union-supportive, and legal concepts (see Chapter III).
An analysis of variance was performed on the data and the 
results for the evaluative scales are recorded in Table 5-2
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EXHIBIT 5-11
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TABLE 5-2
Analysis of Variance for Labor Union Membership, 
Type of Concept, and Interactions
Source d.f s.s m. s F-ratio
Regression 5 214.55 42.91 78.35
Labor 1 0.16 0.16 0.30
Type 2 210.41 105.20 192.11**
Labor * Type 2 3.97 1.99 3.63*
Error 448 245.34 .055
♦Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance = .01
The concepts of the semantic differential test as
classified in Chapter III demonstrate a significant differ­
ence at the .01 level with an F-ratio of 192.11. In addi­
tion, the interaction between types of concepts and labor 
union experience is found to be significant at the .05 
level with an F-ratio of 3.63.
Of particular importance to the present hypoth­
esis is the reversal of high and low scores for management- 
supportive and union-supportive concepts, as illustrated in 
Figure 5-2. The respondent arbitrators with union member­
ship experience rated union-supportive concepts higher 
than those respondent arbitrators without such experience. 
This situation reversed for the management-supportive con­
cepts where the union-experienced respondent arbitrators 
rated these concepts lower than did those arbitrators with­
out union membership experience. The mean evaluative score
FIGURE 5-2
Interactions by Union Membership Experience and Type of Concept for 
Evaluative and Potency Scales and Total Means
A B C
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for arbitrators with union experience is 5.24; the mean 
evaluative score for non-experienced arbitrators is 5.48.
For the union-supportive concepts the mean evaluative 
scores are 5.29 for arbitrators with union experience and 
5.07 for arbitrators without union membership experience. 
Experience as a labor union member seems to influence the 
attitudes of the respondent arbitrators as measured by the 
semantic differential test. The nature of the influence 
is to give more support to those concepts which are union- 
supportive and less support to those concepts which are 
management-supportive.
As interesting as these findings may be, they do 
not adequately support acceptance of the present hypothesis.
Experience in Terms of Residence
The next hypothesis concerned with non-arbitration 
experience is related to the respondent arbitrators' geo­
graphic location. For the purpose of testing this hypoth­
esis, the United States was divided into four regions:
North, East, South, and West. The classification of any 
particular state may be determined by reference to Figure 
1-4. The specific hypothesis to be tested follows:
Hypothesis 11: Arbitrators' attitudes about
certain cognitive objects are 
a function of their geographic 
location.
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Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were asked to give 
their state of residence and.150 of the 152 usable respon­
ses complied with this request, making it possible to lo­
cate them geographically. They were then classified by 








There were two concepts found to be statistically 
significantly different in comparing the responses to the 
semantic differential test by geographical region. These 
two concepts were COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector) 
and MANAGEMENT RIGHTS. The "t" test was used to isolate 
the paired classifications with significant differences.
The mean scores used to accomplish the "t" test are given 
below:
Geographical





The concept COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private
Sector) was found to be significantly different for those
respondent arbitrators from the North as compared to each
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of the three other regions. The "t" score for the North- 
East comparison was 2.61, significant at the .01 level; for 
the North-South comparison the "t" score was 4.16, signifi­
cant at the .01 level; and for the North-West comparison 
the "t" score was 2.59, which is significant at the .05 
level. None of the additional comparisons between the 
regions East, South, and West were significant.
A glance at Exhibit 5-13 indicates the rather 
neutral position adopted by the North as compared to the 
other three regions. There seems to be much stronger sup­
port for the idea of COMPULSORY ARBITRATION existing among 
the respondent arbitrators residing in the North, or at 
least they are not as opposed to the concept as the rest 
of the labor arbitrators throughout the United States.
The other concept found to be statistically 
significantly different by geographic location was MANAGE­
MENT RIGHTS. There are three comparisons of significance.
The North-East comparison again is significantly different 
at the .01 level with a "t" score of 3.35. The East-South 
comparison is significantly different at the .01 level with 
a "t" score of 3.75, and the South-West comparison is sig­
nificant at the .05 level with a "t" score of 2.06. Exhibit 
5-14 represents the semantic profiles of the various re­
gions and indicates that the responses of arbitrators re­
siding in the South exhibit the strongest support for the 




































keeping with the general reputation of the South as being 
more conservative than other parts of the United States.
Test for Interactions
The respondent arbitrators' geographic location 
was treated as a type of non-arbitration experience and was 
tested for possible interaction with the concepts of the 
semantic differential test as classified into management- 
supportive, union-supportive, and legal concepts. An analy 
sis of variance test was performed on the data and the re­
sults for the potency scales are recorded in Table 5-3.
TABLE 5-3
Analysis of Variance for Geographical Location, 
Type of Concept, and Interactions
Source d.f s. s m. s F-ratio
Regression 11 23.21 2.11 6.22
Residence 3 2.22 .77 2.19
Type 2 16.59 8.29 24.49**
Res. * Type 6 4.39 .73 2.16*
Error 436 147.70 .34
*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance = .01
As before, the concepts as classified in Chap­
ter III demonstrate a statistically significant difference 
at the .01 level with an F-ratio of 24.49. In addition, 
the interaction between types of concepts and geographic 
location is found to be significant at the .05 level with
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an F-ratio of 2.16. This significant interaction is appar­
ently the result of the significant differences of the mean 
responses by geographic location to the legal concepts.
Figure 5-3 demonstrates visually these relationships. More 
specifically, the significant differences are a direct re­
sult of the relatively high mean score assigned the legal 
concepts by those respondent arbitrators from the North.
The responses by Northern arbitrators were slightly above 
neutral (4.0) at 4.02 while the remaining regions were de­
cidedly negative with scores of: East = 3.60, South = 3.72,
and West = 3.58.
Although not judged as statistically significant, 
note the reversals between North and South responses for 
evaluative scales for management-supportive and union- 
supportive concepts, as seen in Figure 5-3 (A). Also, note 
similar reversals for the potency scales East and South.
In both cases the respondent arbitrators from the South 
gave more relative support to the management-supportive 
concepts and less relative support for the union-supportive 
concepts.
Although the present hypothesis has received 
support from interesting sources as well as demonstrating 
significant interactions, it is felt that an adequate 
amount of support is lacking and the hypothesis is rejected.
FIGURE 5-3
Interactions by Geographic Location and Type of Concept for 
Evaluative and Potency Scales and Total Means
A B C  























Experience as a NAA Member 
The final hypothesis concerning non-arbitration 
experience is related to the.respondent arbitrators' mem­
bership or non-membership in the National Academy of Arbi­
trators.
Hypothesis 12: Arbitrators who are members
of the National Academy of 
Arbitrators have different 
attitudes about certain cog­
nitive objects than non-members.
NAA membership is severely restricted to experi­
enced labor arbitration practitioners, as established in 
Chapter I.
Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified accord­





The sample response reflects to a substantial 
degree the composition of the sample mail-out which was 
50 percent (200) NAA members and 50 percent (200) non­
members. Testing of the final hypothesis will conclude 
this portion of the study.
Test for Differences
The only concept found to be statistically sig­




to NAA membership or non-membership is UNION PENETRATION 
OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS. This concept was 
found to be significant at the .01 level with an F-ratio 
of 6.54 along the potency dimension. A glance at Exhibit 
5-15 reveals that NAA member arbitrators, as well as non­
member arbitrators, generally consider the concept to be 
rather neutral. And, although significant differences 
exist, it appears that no real distinction is made as to 
which group has stronger feelings about the concept. The 
reason, as demonstrated by the semantic profile, is that 
one-half of the scales indicate stronger responses by the 
NAA members and the remaining one-half of the scales indi­
cate weaker responses by NAA membership. The remaining 
step in the analysis is to test for interactions.
Test for Interactions
Non-arbitration experience in terms of NAA mem­
bership was then tested for possible interaction with the 
concepts of the semantic differential test as classified 
into management-supportive, union-supportive, and legal 
concepts, according to Chapter III. An analysis of vari­
ance was performed on the data and the results for the 
total means are recorded in Table 5-4.
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EXHIBIT 5-15
















Analysis of Variance for NAA Membership, 
Type of Concept, and Interactions
Source d.f s. s m.s F-ratio
Regression 5 98.08 18.41 53.06
NAA 1 .36 .36 1.05
Type 2 87.04 43.07 125.36**
NAA * Type 2 4.66 2.33 6.72**
Error 448 155.53 .34
**Level of Significance = .01
The concepts of the semantic differential as 
classified in Chapter III are significantly different at 
the .01 level with an F-ratio of 125.36. The interaction 
between types of concepts and NAA membership is found to 
be significant at the .01 level with an F-ratio of 6.72.
The interactions are graphically illustrated in Figure 5-4. 
Apparently the interactions resulted due to the lower 
scores attributed to the legal concepts by those respondent 
arbitrators holding NAA membership. However, the management- 
supportive and union-supportive concepts received higher 
scores from NAA members than non-members. This may evidence 
a greater respect for both institutions, management and 
union, by NAA members.
The hypothesis being tested is not well-supported 
and must be rejected.
FIGURE 5-4
Interactions by NAA Membership and Type of Concept for 
Evaluative and Potency Scales and Total Means
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Results for Non-Arbitration Experience
Non-arbitration experience in terms of management 
employment and labor union membership is quite often the 
reason for rejection of arbitrator candidates by the par­
ties. The obvious implication is that the parties feel 
that such experience will render the individual less "ob­
jective” and, thus, bias his decision. If this is the 
case, perhaps other forms of non-arbitration experience 
may also influence the attitudes of labor arbitrators.
Hence, this study has identified five forms of non­
arbitration experience resulting in the design of five 
individual hypotheses which have been tested against the 
semantic differential data. The results for these hypoth­
eses are summarized below.
Hypothesis 8 indicates that previous employment 
with the federal government in an agency dealing with the 
labor sector, such as the NLRB or WLB, may influence the 
attitudes of labor arbitrators as reflected by the results 
of the semantic differential test. Four of the eight con­
cepts of the semantic differential test proved to be 
statistically significantly different. The significant 
concepts are: THE LABOR MOVEMENT, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS,
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector), and MANAGEMENT 
RIGHTS. Thus, the hypothesis is well-supported and was 
accepted.
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Hypothesis 9 suggests that the attitudes of labor 
arbitrators may be influenced by previous managerial employ­
ment as reflected by the results of the semantic differen­
tial test. Two of the eight concepts of the semantic dif­
ferential test were found to be statistically significantly 
different with a third concept nearly significant. The 
significant concepts are UNION LEADERSHIP and ECONOMIC 
EFFICIENCY, and the concept that was almost significant is 
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS. These three concepts include the two 
concepts labeled as management-supportive. Primarily on 
this basis the hypothesis was accepted.
Hypothesis 10 suggests that labor union member­
ship experience may influence the attitudes of labor arbi­
trators as determined by the semantic differential test.
Two of the eight concepts of the semantic differential test 
were found to be statistically significantly different.
They are: WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS and COMPULSORY ARBITRA­
TION. This hypothesis, although partially supported, was 
rejected.
Hypothesis 11 maintained that the attitudes of 
labor arbitrators may vary depending on their geographic 
residence. This hypothesis was partially supported. Sig­
nificant differences were found for the two concepts of 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION and MANAGEMENT RIGHTS. However, the 
hypothesis was rejected.
Hypothesis 12 concerned labor arbitrators as 
members or non-members of the National Academy of Arbitra­
tors. More specifically, the hypothesis states that the 
attitudes of labor arbitrators may vary depending on NAA 
membership. A single concept, UNION PENETRATION OF MANA­
GERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS, proved to be statistically 
significantly different. This final hypothesis of the 
study was rejected.
Conclusions
Direct labor arbitration experience is the pri­
mary criteria utilized for selection of individual arbi­
trators by labor and management. When a choice exists 
between an experienced and an inexperienced arbitrator, 
it is generally accepted that the parties select the ex­
perienced arbitrator. The hypotheses tested in this chap­
ter were designed to disclose differences alleged to exist 
between the experienced and inexperienced arbitrators.
For hypotheses formation, two different aspects 
of experience were identified: (1) direct arbitration
experience, and (2) non-arbitration experience. Direct 
labor arbitration experience was "measured" by: (1) years
of experience as an arbitrator, (2) actual number of arbi­
tral decisions rendered, and (3) whether the arbitrator 
respondent considers himself (or herself) to be employed 
on a full-time or part-time basis. The following three
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hypotheses concerning direct arbitration experience were 
formulated and tested:
H,.: More experienced arbitrators, in terms
of years, have different attitudes 
about certain cognitive objects than 
less experienced arbitrators.
Hfi: More experienced arbitrators, in terms
of decisions, have different attitudes 
about certain cognitive objects than 
less experienced arbitrators.
H_: Part-time arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cognitive ob­
jects than full-time arbitrators.
Each of the previously mentioned hypotheses con­
cerning direct arbitration experience was rejected.
The second aspect of experience, non-arbitration 
experience, was "measured" by: (1) federal employment with
an agency concerned with the labor sector, such as the 
NLRB, WLB, or United States Department of Labor, (2) man­
agement experience with a firm, (3) experience as a labor 
union member, (4) residence according to geographic loca­
tion, and (5) NAA membership. The following five hypoth­
eses concerning non-arbitration experience were formulated 
and tested:
Hg: Arbitrators who have worked for a
federal labor agency have different 
attitudes about certain cognitive ob­
jects than those who have not been 
employed by a federal labor agency.
Hq : Arbitrators who have held management
positions in private firms have different 
attitudes about certain cognitive objects 
than those without such management ex­
perience.
H,q : Arbitrators who have held union
membership have different attitudes 
about certain cognitive objects than 
arbitrators without union membership 
experience.
Hll: Arbitrators' attitudes about certain
cognitive objects are a function of 
their geographic location.
H12: Arbitrators who are members of the
National Academy of Arbitrators have 
different attitudes about certain 
cognitive objects than non-members.
Hypothesis 8 was supported very well by the 
analysis of the semantic differential data which indicated 
significant differences for these four concepts: THE LABOR
MOVEMENT, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, and 
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS. Thus, Hypothesis 8 was accepted.
Hypothesis 9 was supported by the existence of 
significant differences for the two concepts UNION LEADER­
SHIP and ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, as well as by a third con­
cept, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS, which was almost at the acceptable 
level of significance (.05) at .07. Primarily because of 
the specific concepts involved, Hypothesis 9 was accepted.
Hypotheses 10, 11, and 12 were rejected. How­
ever, Hypotheses 10 and 11 were supported by the existence 
of significant differences for two concepts each. Hypoth­
esis 12 demonstrated a significant difference on one concept.
The most important finding of Chapter V is that 
experiences other than direct arbitration experience proved 
to be important in differentiating the attitudes of pro­
fessional arbitrators. Direct arbitration experience is
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not a source of attitudinal differences for labor arbitra­
tors, according to the results of this study. The signifi­
cant differences which were identified were essentially 
non-arbitral in nature, such as federal employment, manage­
ment employment, and union membership experience.
"Arbitrators, unlike judges, do not have a common 
professional background, nor are they all trained in the 
same system of t h i n k i n g . T h e  results of this study 
reflect and support that statement.




Summary and Conclusions 
World War II and the policies of the National War 
Labor Board served as the springboard for growth and accept­
ance of grievance arbitration as a viable alternative to 
industrial strife. Many labor arbitrator practitioners of 
today gained entry into the field as a direct result of 
experience gained through such governmental agencies as the 
NWLB and the NLRB. These and others have gained entry to 
the field also as a result of judicial and/or academic 
backgrounds as the parties searched for informed neutrals.
As a result, the 300 to 400 labor arbitrators handling 90 
percent of the labor arbitration cases tend to be either 
highly experienced lawyers or economists.
Looking to the future, it appears that attorneys 
are gaining support as replacements for the labor arbitra­
tors who leave the field. With this notion in mind, the 
research was established to determine whether differences 
exist in the attitudes of professional labor arbitrators 
based on education, age, and experience. The literature 
recognizes the possibility that differences in educational 
backgrounds, lawyer versus economist, may determine the
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outcome of an arbitration award. The parties are reluctant 
to select an individual who is not highly experienced as 
an arbitrator. The notion became evident that empirical 
research was needed in order to evaluate the attitudinal 
overtones implicit in the practices of labor and management. 
Thus, a primary research effort was undertaken in an effort 
to determine the existence of attitudinal differences based 
on education, age, and experience. A summary of the. hypoth­
eses tested in this study, together with results by educa­
tion, age, and experience, follows.
The following three hypotheses are designed to 
determine the effects, if any, of educational background 
on the attitudes of labor arbitrators.
H.: Lawyer-arbitrators have different atti­
tudes about certain cognitive objects 
than economist-arbitrators.
H2 : Lawyer-arbitrators have different atti­
tudes about certain cognitive objects 
than arbitrators classified as "Other."
• Economist-arbitrators have different 
attitudes about certain cognitive ob­
jects than arbitrators classified as 
"Other."
The following hypothesis is designed to determine 
the effect, if any, of age on the attitudes of labor arbi­
trators.
H.: Younger arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cognitive 
objects than older arbitrators.
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The following hypotheses were designed to deter­
ment the effect, if any, of experience on the attitudes of 
labor arbitrators.
Hypotheses concerning direct arbitration experi­
ence:
H_: More experienced arbitrators, in terms
of years, have different attitudes about 
certain cognitive objects than less ex­
perienced arbitrators.
Hg: More experienced arbitrators, in terms
of decisions, have different attitudes 
about certain cognitive objects than 
less experienced arbitrators.
H_: Part-time arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cognitive ob­
jects than full-time arbitrators.
Hypotheses concerning non-arbitration experience:
. Hg: Arbitrators who have worked for a federal
labor agency have different attitudes 
about certain cognitive objects than 
those who have not been employed by a 
federal labor agency.
Hg : Arbitrators who have held management
positions in private firms have different 
attitudes about certain cognitive objects 
than those without such management ex­
perience.
H.0 : Arbitrators who have held union member­
ship have different attitudes about 
certain cognitive objects than arbitra­
tors without union membership experience.
H., : Arbitrators' attitudes about certain
cognitive objects are a function of their 
geographic location.
h12: Arbitrators who are members of the
National Academy of Arbitrators have 
different attitudes about certain cog­
nitive objects than non-members.
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The data used to test the preceeding hypotheses 
were gathered by sending 400 questionnaires to professional 
labor arbitrators. Each of the 152 respondent arbitrators 
completed a semantic differential test by evaluating the 
following eight concepts in terms of 10 bipolar adjective 
scales:
WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS
THE LABOR MOVEMENT
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS




UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION­
MAKING AREAS
Along with the semantic differential test the 
questionnaire gathered information on the respondent arbi­
trators' educational backgrounds, ages, and experiences.
Of the 400 questionnaires mailed out, 202 or 51 percent 
were returned and of these, 152 or 43 percent were usable 
for analytical purposes. The summary and conclusions of 
this empirical research follow.
Education Influences the Attitudes 
of Respondent Arbitrators
To test the three hypotheses concerned with edu­
cation, the respondent arbitrators were classified accord­
ing to academic degree: Law, Economics, and "other."
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Then, the means of the semantic differential scores were 
tested for statistically significant differences at the 
.05 level of significance.
Lawyers and economists were the concern of 
Hypothesis 1 and they demonstrated differences on these 
three concepts: RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
(Private Sector), and UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL 
DECISION-MAKING AREAS. The first hypothesis was accepted.
The attitudes of lawyer-arbitrators were different from 
those of economist-arbitrators, as reflected by the semantic 
differential data. Another important finding revealed that 
economist-arbitrators rated union-supportive concepts higher 
than did lawyer-arbitrators, while on management-supportive 
concepts the scores of lawyer-arbitrators were higher than 
economist-arbitrators. Although the differences in mean 
scores were not statistically significant, the reversal 
suggests that the attitudes of lawyer-arbitrators are more 
favorably disposed toward management, while the attitudes 
of economist-arbitrators tend to be more supportive of 
labor unions.
The attitudes of economist-arbitrators were 
definitely negative toward the legal concepts: WAGE AND
PRICE CONTROLS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector), 
and RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, whereas lawyer-arbitrators tended 
to be neutral to positive, indicating a more favorable 
relative feeling toward these concepts. It is likely that
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the response of lawyer-arbitrators is reflective of their 
judicial backgrounds.
The second hypothesis suggested differences in 
attitudes for lawyer-arbitrators and "other"-arbitrators.
Only one concept proved to be significantly different, 
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS. This hypothesis was rejected. Appar­
ently, the attitudes of lawyer-arbitrators and "other"- 
arbitrators are rather similar. However, the test for 
interaction revealed a reversal similar to the finding for 
the first hypothesis. Again, lawyer-arbitrators gave more 
credence to the management-supportive concepts while 
"others" gave their support to the union-supportive con­
cepts. Thus, in comparison to economist-arbitrators and 
"other"-arbitrators, the lawyer-arbitrators were consistent 
in their support for management-supportive concepts as 
opposed to the union-supportive concepts. Also, the 
lawyer-arbitrators, once again, demonstrated favorable 
attitudes toward the legal concepts as compared to the 
unfavorable response of "other"-arbitrators.
The third and final hypothesis concerning educa­
tion compared economist-arbitrators to "other"-arbitrators. 
Three concepts were found to be significantly different: 
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector), 
and ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY. The third hypothesis was accepted. 
The analysis of the data revealed that the significant dif­
ferences were due to the economist-arbitrators opting for
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more extreme positions on each concept. It appears that 
the economist-arbitrators have expressed stronger views 
than "other"-arbitrators. This is especially evident with 
the analysis for interactions in which economist-arbitrators 
rated both management-supportive and union-supportive con­
cepts higher than did "other"-arbitrators, and rated the 
legal concepts lower than did "other"-arbitrators.
The different educational backgrounds of labor 
arbitrators are responsible for the significant differences 
in their responses to the semantic differential test. In­
asmuch as the responses of ”other"-arbitrators generally 
fall between the responses of lawyer-arbitrators and 
economist-arbitrators, the significant finding involves 
primarily lawyer-arbitrators and economist-arbitrators.
This finding becomes more important when it is noted that 
"other"-arbitrators comprise only 12.5 percent of this 
research sample and probably less than that of the popula­
tion. According to this study, whether the arbitrator is 
a lawyer or economist becomes significant.
Age Influences the Attitudes 
of Respondent Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified accord­
ing to Age as follows: less than 50 years, 50-60 years,
and over 60 years. Only one concept, UNION PENETRATION OF 
MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS, proved to be significantly 
different, and that was along both dimensions, evaluative 
and potency. This hypothesis was rejected. The first
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significant difference was between those arbitrators less 
than 50 years of age and those over 60 years of age, and 
occurred along the evaluative.dimension at the .01 level 
of significance. The second significant difference was 
between those arbitrators 50-60 years old and those over 
60 years old, and occurred along the potency dimension at 
the .05 level. Thus, the greater the age difference the 
greater the level of significance.
The over 60 years of age group responded rather 
negatively to the concept while the younger groups were 
neutral to positive in their responses. Thus, the atti­
tudes of the older group toward UNION PENETRATION OF MANA­
GERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS was definitely unfavorable.
It is interesting to note, also, that the older group 
responded most favorably to the concept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS. 
Apparently, the older arbitrators support management to 
a greater extent than younger arbitrators. Should the 
average age of future arbitrators become younger, as appears 
likely, management may lose whatever support derives from 
the attitudinal differences between younger and older 
arbitrators.
Certain Types of Experience Influences 
the Attitudes of Respondent Arbitrators
Labor and management are reluctant to employ the 
services of inexperienced labor arbitrators. Due to this 
reluctance, one purpose of this study was to ascertain any
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possible differences in the attitudes of respondent arbi­
trators based on differences in experience. In order to 
test a full range of experience, this variable was classi­
fied initially into (1) direct arbitration experience and 
(2) non-arbitration experience. Data based on direct 
arbitration experience were gathered and classified accord­
ing to (1) years as a labor arbitrator, (2) numbers of 
arbitration decisions rendered, and (3) whether the arbi­
trator considered himself as devoting full time or part 
time to arbitration activities. Each classification of 
direct arbitration experience was represented by separate 
hypotheses to be tested against the semantic differential 
data. Hypothesis 5, concerning direct arbitration expe­
rience in terms of years, was rejected, as only one con­
cept, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector), proved to 
be significant. Hypothesis 6, concerning direct arbitra­
tion experience in terms of numbers of arbitral decisions, 
was rejected, as there were no concepts found to be signi­
ficantly different for this variable. Hypothesis 7, con­
cerning the amount of time devoted to arbitration activi­
ties, was rejected, although two concepts were found to be 
significantly different: THE LABOR MOVEMENT and RIGHT-TO-
WORK LAWS. Thus, all three hypotheses concerning direct 
labor arbitration experience were rejected. Even though 
the parties rely heavily in their arbitrator selection pro­
cess on the single factor of direct arbitration experience, 
this study has found no rational basis for this approach.
Non-arbitration experience was classified into 
five different types of experience: (1) employment expe­
rience with a federal agency,concerned with the labor sec­
tor, (2) management experience with a firm, (3) labor union 
membership experience, (4) state of residence, and (5) NAA 
membership. Data were gathered on each type of non­
arbitration experience and analyzed against the semantic 
differential data, to test each associated hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 8, concerning federal experience, was accepted, 
as there were four concepts of the semantic differential 
test which were significantly different. These four con­
cepts were: THE LABOR MOVEMENT, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COM­
PULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector), and MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 
Hypothesis 9, concerning experience as a manager in a firm, 
was accepted, with two concepts being significantly differ­
ent at the .05 level, UNION LEADERSHIP and ECONOMIC EF­
FICIENCY. Additional support was provided by the concept 
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS which, at .07, was close to the pre­
determined level of significance. One would suspect that 
an individual who had been a manager would rate management- 
supportive concepts higher than those individuals without 
such experience, and this is precisely what occurred. 
Hypothesis 10, concerning union membership experience, was 
rejected, although significant differences were found for 
two concepts, WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS and COMPULSORY ARBI­
TRATION (Private Sector). Another important finding was 
that those respondent arbitrators with union membership
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experience rated the union-supportive concepts higher than 
those arbitrators without such experience. Further, those 
arbitrators without union membership experience rated the 
management-supportive concepts higher than did arbitrators 
who had been union members. It appears that union member­
ship experience does have some influence on the attitudes 
of respondent arbitrators.
Hypothesis 11, concerning geographic residence, 
was rejected, although significant differences were found 
for two concepts, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector) 
and MANAGEMENT RIGHTS. The differences for the former 
concept were primarily due to the rather neutral to posi­
tive score of Northern arbitrators while all other regions 
responded negatively. Whereas, the differences for the 
concept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS seemed to be caused by the more 
positive support coming from Southern arbitrators. Hypoth­
esis 12, concerning NAA membership, was rejected, as only 
one concept proved to be significantly different, UNION 
PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS.
The following summary provides a quick comparison 
of the results for direct arbitration experience and non­
arbitration experience.
Experience Concepts on Which
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According to the results of this study, manage­
ment and labor have been relying on the wrong type of 
experience in their selection procedures. Direct labor 
arbitration experience did not influence to an appreciable 
extent the attitudes of the respondent arbitrators as mea­
sured by the semantic differential data. In fact, expe­
rience, in terms of numbers of arbitration cases decided, 
was the only one of 12 variables tested by this study which 
failed to be differentiated by at least one concept of the 
semantic differential test.
By a large margin, the differences in attitudes 
based on experience resulted from non-arbitral kinds of 
experience. The attitudes of respondent arbitrators were 
statistically significantly different based on (1) federal 
experience and (2) management experience. Further, the 
attitudes of respondent arbitrators were differentiated by
two concepts each for union membership experience and 
state of residence.
The results of this study rather conclusively 
state that the attitudes of labor arbitrators are not in­
fluenced by direct arbitration experience, but appear to 
be derived from non-arbitration types of experience. Per­
haps the parties should begin to look more extensively 
into the backgrounds of the individuals selected to hear 
their arbitration cases.
Implications
It is the part of equity to make allow­
ances for human weaknesses; to look not 
to the law but to the legislator; not to 
the letter of the law but to the purpose 
of the lawgiver; not to the action alone 
of the accused, but to the inherent moti­
vation of his action; not to the isolated 
part but to the whole; not to the character 
of a man as he appears at the moment but 
to his habitual or life mode of behavior; 
for him to remember the good he has re­
ceived rather than the evil, endure a wrong 
with patience; to be disposed to reach a 
decision through discussion rather than by 
direct action; to prefer to engage in arbi­
tration rather than litigation in court, 
for the arbitrator looks to what is reason­
able but the judge is concerned with the 
interpretation of the law. For this reason 
the arbitrator was conceived so that equity 
might thrive.I
Aristotle, Rhetoric (Translated by Barbara E.
Killian).
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What is reasonable to one arbitrator may be un­
reasonable to another. What is equitable to one arbitrator 
may seem inequitable to another. What would prompt manage­
ment to select a lawyer-arbitrator to hear a case concern­
ing a union-security clause at a federal installation in a 
Right-to-Work state? Why would a lawyer-arbitrator sustain 
management in one discharge case while a second and identi­
cal (according to management, maybe stronger) discharge 
case, involving the same parties, was decided for the griev- 
ant by an economist-arbitrator? Reiterating an earlier 
(p. 16) quotation of Parsons:
Beliefs and values are actualized, partially 
and imperfectly, in realistic situations of 
social interaction and the outcomes are al­
ways co-determined by the values and the 
realistic exigencies.
This study has verified empirically the value and attitu­
dinal differences resulting from differing educational and 
experiential backgrounds of labor arbitrators. Associating 
these findings with the labor arbitrator's decision-making 
model developed in Chapter I, the most apparent implication 
of this study is that the decisions of labor arbitrators 
may be expected to vary depending upon their educational 
and experiential backgrounds.
Extension of this implication to the policies of 
the parties in selecting individual labor arbitrators to 
hear specific cases involving specific issues, it would 
likely be advantageous to match as closely as possible the 
issue and the arbitrator's background. This is precisely
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what occurred in the case involving union security at a 
federal installation in a Right-to-Work state. Management 
wanted a strictly legal interpretation, persisted on a 
lawyer-arbitrator hearing the case, and won. The findings 
of this study indicate that lawyer-arbitrators hold posi­
tive viewpoints of legal concepts (including Right-to-Work 
laws) as opposed to the decidedly negative attitudes of 
economist-arbitrators.
The same pattern holds in terms of "framing the 
issue." Suppose, for example, that the grievance involved 
a transfer of work outside the bargaining unit. According 
to the results of this study, it would be advantageous for 
management to plead the virtues of "economic efficiency" 
to an economist-arbitrator, especially in the case of a 
marginal firm, whereas for a lawyer-arbitrator, management 
would be wise to argue on the basis of "management rights."
Another implication is derived from the educa­
tional differences of labor arbitrators, and based on the 
finding that economist-arbitrators are more favorably dis­
posed toward union-supportive concepts. To the extent that 
the process of labor arbitration has assisted labor in the 
erosion of management's prerogatives, it may be that 
economist-arbitrators are more responsible than lawyer- 
arbitrators.
A most important implication of these findings 
concerning policy is that perhaps the concept of speciali­
zation is appropriate to labor arbitrators. Certainly
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there are issues better decided by lawyers than economists, 
others better decided by economists than lawyers, and 
still others better decided by engineers. Specialization 
would more certainly and rapidly contribute to the devel­
opment of a more cohesive body of generalizations and 
arbitral standards, resulting in a system of industrial 
jurisprudence.
The foregoing are among the more salient impli­
cations based on the differences in educational back­
grounds of labor arbitrators. They are meant to be 
illustrative, as the writer feels certain that additional 
implications of this research will be forthcoming. The 
writer will next consider implications deriving from dif­
ferences in experiential backgrounds of labor arbitrators.
The first implication concerns direct-arbitration 
experience, primarily in terms of numbers of arbitral deci­
sions rendered. Management and labor are reluctant to make
use of qualified new arbitrators who lack direct case expe- 
2rience. As a direct result, in this writer's opinion the 
supply of acceptable labor arbitrators is kept artificially 
low. Of all hypotheses tested in this study, the hypoth­
esis concerning direct arbitration experience in terms of 
numbers of cases decided was the only one to receive abso­
lutely no support. There were no differences in the
2Harold W. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargain­
ing (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972) , p. 160.
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attitudes of labor arbitrators based on numbers of cases 
decided. Even though the parties rely extensively on this 
criteria in their selection process, this study has found 
no rational basis for this approach.
In terms of policy considerations it seems at 
least plausible that the supply of labor arbitrators could 
be expanded through more extensive use of qualified new 
arbitrators with a lower level exposure to risk (of bad 
decisions) than previously assumed. This position is cor­
roborated by Fleming's research demonstrating the simi­
larities in arbitral decisions of inexperienced and
3experienced labor arbitrators. The risk could be further 
reduced in terms of effect by somehow equating the need 
for experience with the complexity and importance of the 
specific arbitration case. In this manner an inexperienced 
arbitrator may be allowed to hear comparatively simple and 
less important cases early in his career while progressing 
toward the more complex and more important arbitral issues.
Results of this study indicate that direct arbi­
tration experience is not a source of attitudinal differ­
ences, but that non-arbitration experience is a source of 
attitudinal differences, specifically federal experience 
and managerial experience. The logical implication of this 
finding is that perhaps the parties have been relying
3R. W. Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process 
(Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press,
1965), p. 104.
inadvertantly upon the wrong type of experience in their 
selection procedures. Perhaps management and labor need 
to be more concerned in their selection process with the 
predispositions and attitudes of arbitrators who have been 
employed by the federal government in an agency concerned 
with the labor sector.
An important implication concerns the finding 
that management experience does influence the attitudes 
of labor arbitrators. Those labor arbitrators with such 
experience displayed stronger support for management con­
cepts than those without such experience. Evidently, the 
reluctance of the parties to use qualified new arbitrators 
who have had management experience is well-founded. Based 
on this finding, it is advantageous for management to 
select an arbitrator with management experience to hear 
cases involving issues concerning management rights and 
economic efficiency. Of course, the union would wisely 
reject such candidates. It is not surprising that such 
practice already exists.
Recommendations
In seeking firm ground for their decisions, 
arbitrators rely not only on their inter­
pretation of the agreement, the imperatives 
of industry, and on the common law of the 
shop but also on the dominant values of the 
larger society. The arbitrator, by having 
recourse to these changing social values,
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helps to speed their infusion into the 
work place and he thereby contributes to 
the extension of democracy in industrial 
life.4
This study has demonstrated empirically what has 
been, up to this point, based mainly upon a priori reason­
ing: that values among labor arbitrators differ and depend 
upon their educational and experiential backgrounds. If 
indeed this is the case, then one must be concerned with 
which of the dominant and changing societal values are 
being "infused into the work place," and at what point, 
and at what rate, and by whom?
The first recommendation of this researcher is 
further expansion and refinement of the attitudinal data 
base for labor arbitrators. Through additional empirically 
based behavioral research a more composite framework of 
attitudes and values of labor arbitrators may be identified 
and analyzed. Along with acquiring direct information from 
labor arbitrators, management and labor should be queried 
as to the role of perceived value orientations in the 
selection of particular labor arbitrators. Indeed, investi­
gation of the selection process of management and labor may 
prove to be equally as fruitful as directly accessing the 
ranks of arbitrators. This is especially important since
4Eli Ginzberg, et. al., Democratic Values and the 
Rights of Management (New York: Columbia University Press,
1963), p. 18.
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many arbitrators absolve themselves of the influences of 
personal values and attitudes in their arbitral decision­
making.
A second recommendation of this researcher con­
cerns the relationship of the work place and the issues 
involved. Arbitration cases are normally reported accord­
ing to the issue involved, such as: management rights,
union security, picketing, etc. Classification of cases 
according to industry and job type may yield valuable 
information for management and labor in the form of identi­
fying troublesome work areas. Perhaps the arbitrator is 
more or less sympathetic toward a particular work group 
or work place.
A third recommendation involves a determination 
of the rate at which labor arbitrators are "infusing” 
dominant social values into the work place. For example, 
a firm may be marginal and may be dependent upon increased 
economic efficiency for survival. Does the arbitrator con­
sider these factors when deciding a case concerning out-of­
unit transfers of work? Are there factors less important 
to the firm that is in a more competitive position?
A fourth recommendation flows rather naturally 
out of this study. As the attitudes and values of labor 
arbitrators are identified they should be compared to the 
actual decisions as reported by the arbitrators. In this 
manner, hopefully, the gap between values and decisions 
may be bridged.
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A more specific recommendation is that the 
parties, as well as the labor arbitrators, begin to pub­
lish the significant labor arbitration cases to a greater 
extent than the present 4 percent. This would be of 
interest to all involved, management, labor, arbitrators, 
and researchers.
A final avenue of additional research is the 
use of hypothetical arbitration cases to compare value 
orientations with the hypothetical arbitral decisions.
This approach would involve very little risk to established 
labor arbitrators and would be of value in the selection 
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College of Business Adm inistration
D EPARTM ENT OF M ANAG EM ENT
February 28, 1974
Dear Mr. Arbitrator:
Is there a difference in whether a professional 
labor arbitrator is a lawyer-arbitrator or an economist- 
arbitrator, or trained in some other discipline? Whether 
he has little or a great deal of labor arbitration experi­
ence? Whether he lives in the South or in the North, East 
or West? Or could it be that even with their wide diver­
sity of backgrounds and experiences, professional labor 
arbitrators actually have similar impressions of certain 
concepts related to industrial relations?
I am attempting to answer these types of questions 
for my doctoral dissertation research in Management and 
Economics at Louisiana State University and I need your 
help. The completion of this project depends upon your 
responding to the enclosed questionnaire which is designed 
to provide data for my research. Will you please take 
fifteen minutes of your time to complete the questionnaire 
and return it to me in the stamped envelope? I will be 
happy to share the results with you upon request.
My analysis of the data will be aggregate and 
strictly statistical in nature, thus insuring your anonymity. 
I assure you that the data and its origin will remain confi­
dential.
With your help I will be able to bring my doctoral 
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Further understanding of the labor arbitration 
process and our roles as practitioners is the purpose of 
a dissertation research project now under way by Mr. Ed W. 
Bankston, doctoral candidate at L.S.U.
As each of us is concerned with the development, 
promotion and future success of labor arbitration it is in 
our interest to expand present knowledge of arbitration. 
The knowledge generated by this research should be a use­
ful contribution to the literature.
It is my opinion that this is a worthwhile en­
deavor and I hope that you will assist Mr. Bankston by 
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College o f Business Adm inistration
D EPAR TM EN T OF M AN AG EM EN T
March 18, 1974
Dear Mr. Arbitrator:
Recently I mailed you a questionnaire asking for 
your help in completing a study of labor arbitrators. 
Initial response has been very encouraging; and if you 
have already returned the questionnaire, please consider 
this letter a personal "Thank you" for your time, effort, 
and especially your interest.
If you have not had a chance as yet to return 
the questionnaire, would you please do so as your partici­
pation is vital to the success of this study. As you know, 
the number of labor arbitrators is not large, therefore, 
each individual response becomes quite important from a 
statistical standpoint.
This study can be meaningful to labor arbitration 
but only through your active support.




The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain your 
impressions of a variety of things or ideas. For exam­
ple, following this paragraph is the word BUREAUCRACY.
You are to give your impression of what this means to 
you by placing an X on each of a series of scales which 
appear beneath it on the same page. Each scale is 
defined by a pair of words. (See the example below.) 
Place an X on each scale in one of the seven spaces which 
to you most accurately describes the particular thing or 
idea. On each page you will find a different concept to 
be judged and beneath it a set of scales. The following 
illustrate how you might mark the scales for a particular 
thing or idea.
BUREAUCRACY
large  : X :____ :____ :____ :_____  : small
flexible ____:____ :____ :____ :_____: X r____ : rigid
Please, place an X on every scale.
You are encouraged to work carefully, but at a fairly high 
rate of speed. Do not be puzzled over individual items; 
it is your first impression that is important. Make each 
item a separate and independent judgment.
The concluding pages of the questionnaire are designed to 
obtain some extremely important data.
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to
what the following concept means to you.






















Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to
























Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to






















Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to
what the following concept means to you.
"ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY"





















Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to























Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to
what the following concept means to you.























To help me with the statistical analysis of the data, 
please give the following information about yourself.
1 . Your age (check one): 
less than 35 
35 - 39 
40 - 44 
45 - 49 
50 - 54 
55 - 59
________ 60 - 64
65 or more
2. How many total years of formal education did you
complete, including school, university, and technical 
school?
3. If you attended a university or a technical school, 
what was the speciality you studied? (Check one):
________ Law
________ Economics
________ Business or Labor Relations
________ Other (please specify)
4. How many years have you been a labor arbitrator? 
(Check one):
________ less than 3 years
________ 3 to 5 years
________ 5 to 10 years
________ 10 to 20 years
________ 20 to 30 years
________ 30 to 40 years
________ more than 40 years





6 . How many labor arbitration decisions have you rendered? 
(Check one) :
_______  less than 10
11 to 20
_______  21 to 50
51 to 100 
101 to 200
_______  201 to 500
more than 500





8 . Have you ever been employed by the U.S. Dept, of Labor, 
the NLRB, WLB, or other government agency whose primary 
concern involved the labor sector?
Yes —  which agency 
No
9. Have you ever held a management position in a firm?
_______  Yes
No
10. Have you ever been a member of a labor union?
_______  Yes
No




12. Your state of residence: __________________
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Analysis of Variance for Age, Degree, Expy, Time, 
Expn, Fed, Mang, Labor, Res, and NAA, by 
Type of Concept, and Interactions
Source d.f. s. s. m. s. F-ratio
Regression 8 89.18 11.14 31.31**
Age 2 0.21 0.10 0.30
Type 2 87.07 43.52 122.29**
Age * Type 4 1.88 0.47 1.32
Error 445 158.42 0.35
Regression 8 98.34 12.19 36.67**
Degree 2 3.32 1.66 4.95**
Type 2 86.92 43.46 129.60**
Degree * Type 4 8.14 2.07 6.07**
Error 445 149.22 0.33
Regression 8 90.39 11.29 31.97**
Expy 2 1.18 0.59 1.67
Type 2 87.17 43.58 123.37**
Expy * Type 4 2.03 0.50 1.43
Error 445 157.22 0.35
Regression 8 87.20 10.90 30.23**
Time 2 0.03 0.01 0.04
Type 2 87.10 43.55 120.81**
Time * Type 4 0.06 0.01 0.04
Error 445 160.41 0.36
Regression 8 89.08 11.13 31.25**
Expn 2 0.49 0.24 0.69
Type 2 87.12 43.56 122.28**
Expn * Type 4 1.46 0.73 1.02
Error 445 158.52 0.35
**Level of Significance = .01
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Source d.f. s. s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 5 97.91 19.58 58.60**
Fed 1 4.98 4.98 14.91**
Type 2 86.89 43.45 130.01**
Fed * Type 2 6.04 3.02 9.03**
Error 448 149.70 0.33
Regression 5 89.67 17.93 50.87**
Mang 1 1.57 1.57 4.45*
Type 2 87.12 43.56 123.57**
Mang * Type 2 0.98 0.49 1.39
Error 448 157.93 0.35
Regression 5 88.83 17.76 50.13**
Labor 1 0.08 0.08 0.23
Type 2 87.09 43.54 122.87**
Labor * Type 2 1.65 0.82 2.33
Error 448 158.77 0.35
Regression 11 91.04 8.27 23.79**
Res 3 3. 37 1.12 3.23*
Type 2 83.71 41.85 120.34**
Res * Type 6 3.94 0.65 1.89
Error 436 151.65 0.34
Regression 5 92.08 18.41 53.04**
NAA 1 0.36 0.36 1.05
Type 2 87.04 43.52 125.36**
NAA * Type 2 4.66 2.33 6.72**
Error 448 155.53 0.34
*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance = .01
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Analysis of Variance for Variables: WE, WP, LE, LP, 
RE, RP, CE, CP, UE, UP, EE, EP, ME, MP, PE, and PP 
As Functions of Age, Degree, Expy, Time,
Expn, Fed, Mang, Labor, Res, and NAA
"WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS" 
(Evaluative Scales)
Source d.f. s.s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 18 17.00 0.94 0.61
Age 2 1.91 0.95 0.62
Degree 2 0.12 0.06 0.04
Expy 2 0.71 0.35 2.31
Time 1 0.10 0.10 0.06
Expn 2 4.40 2.20 1.42
Fed 1 0.28 0.28 0.18
Mang 1 2.56 2.56 1.66
Labor 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
Res 3 0.66 0.22 0.14
NAA 1 0.02 0.02 0.01
Error 100 153.95 1.39
"WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS" 
(Potency Scales)
Source d.f. s.s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 18 12.75 0.70 1.08
Age 2 0.19 0.09 0.14
Degree 2 0.18 0.09 0.14
Expy 2 2.30 1.15 1.76
Time 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
Expn 2 1.36 0.68 1.03
Fed 1 0.06 0.06 0.09
Mang 1 0.24 0.24 0.37
Labor 1 3.93 3.93 6 .00**
Res 3 3.26 1.08 1.65
NAA 1 0.15 0.15 0.62
Error 100 65.57 0.65
**Level of Significance = .01
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"THE LABOR MOVEMENT" 
(Evaluative Scales)
Source d.f. s.s. m. s . F-ratio
Regression 18 5.60 0.31 0.77
Age 2 0.16 0.08 0.21
Degree 2 1.62 0.81 2.01
Expy 2 0.34 0.17 0.43
Time 1 0.55 0.55 1.36
Expn 2 0.64 0.32 0.79
Fed 1 0.53 0.53 1.32
Mang 1 0.08 0.08 0.20
Labor 1 1.13 1.13 2.82
Res 3 0.23 0.07 0.19
NAA 1 0.03 0.03 0.09
Error 100 40.30 0.40
"THE LABOR MOVEMENT"
(Potency Scales)
Source d.f. s.s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 18 6.88 0.38 1.28
Age 2 0.31 0.15 0.53
Degree 2 0.66 0.33 1.12
Expy 2 0.36 0.18 0.61
Time 1 2.04 2.04 6 .86**
Expn 2 0.62 0.31 1.05
Fed 1 1.29 1.29 4.34*
Mang 1 0.07 0.07 0.24
Labor 1 0.06 0 .0.6 0.22
Res 3 0.28 0.09 0.32
NAA 1 0.12 0.12 0.43
Error 100 29.78 0.29
*Level of Significance = .05




Source d.f. s.s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 18 78.62 4.36 2.45
Age 2 2.84 1.42 0.79
Degree 2 10.80 5.40 3.03*
Expy 2 1.91 0.95 0.53
Time 1 7.67 7.67 4.31*
Expn 2 0.56 0.28 0.15
Fed 1 13.92 13.92 7.82**
Mang 1 1.94 1.94 1.09
Labor 1 0.43 0.43 0.24
Res 3 7.78 2.59 1.45
NAA 1 0.21 0.21 0.11
Error 100 177.90 1.77
"RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS"
(Potency Scales)
Source d.f. s.s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 18 26.70 1.48 1.84
Age 2 0.51 0.25 0.31
Degree 2 6.82 3.41 4.24**
Expy 2 2.49 1.24 1.54
Time 1 1.48 1.48 1.84
Expn 2 1.39 0.69 0.86
Fed 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mang 1 1.73 1.73 2.15
Labor 1 0.41 0.41 0.51
Res 3 3.62 1.20 1.50
NAA 1 0.14 0.14 0.18
Error 100 80.43 0.80
*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance = .01
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"COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector)" 
(Evaluative Scales)
Source d.f. s.s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 18 100.77 5.59 3.19^
Age 2 0.34 0.17 0.09
Degree 2 22.15 11.07 6.32^
Expy 2 4.54 2.27 1.29
Time 1 2.95 2.95 1.68
Expn 2 2.90 1.45 0.82
Fed 1 7.27 7.27 4.15A
Mang 1 0.19 0.19 0.11
Labor 1 0.18 0.18 0.10
Res 3 20.00 6.66 3.80^
NAA 1 3.36 3.36 1.91
Error 100 175.24 1.75
"COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector)" 
(Potency Scales)
Source d.f. s.s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 18 28.42 1.57 2 .59^
Age 2 1.11 0.55 0.91
Degree 2 7.65 3.82 6.29^
Expy 2 3.85 1.92 3.16^
Time 1 0.16 0.16 0.26
Expn 2 0.54 0.27 0.44
Fed 1 1.63 1.63 2.69
Mang 1 0.01 0.01 0.02
Labor 1 2.41 2.41 3.91*
Res 3 2.34 0.78 1.28
NAA 1 0.01 0.01 0.03
Error 100 60.85 0.60
♦Level of Significance = .05




Source d.f. s.s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 18 10.60 0.58 1.20
Age 2 0.16 0.08 0.17
Degree 2 1.30 0.65 1.33
Expy 2 0.02 0.01 0.02
Time 1 0.01 0.01 0.02
Expn 2 0.73 0.36 0.75
Fed 1 0.86 0.86 1.76
Mang 1 2.11 2.11 4.32*
Labor 1 0.45 0.45 0.92
Res 3 3.31 1.10 2.25
NAA 1 0.48 0.48 0.98
Error 100 48.99 0.48
"UNION LEADERSHIP"
(Potency Scales)
Source d.f. s.s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 18 7.33 0.40 0.96
Age 2 0.97 0.48 1.15
Degree 2 0.69 0.34 0.82
Expy 2 0.60 0.30 0.71
Time 1 0.70 0.70 1.67
Expn 2 0.29 0.14 0.35
Fed 1 0.78 0.78 1.85
Mang 1 0.02 0.02 0.06
Labor 1 0.53 0.53 1.26
Res 3 0.34 0.11 0.27
NAA 1 0.39 0.39 0.93
Error 100 42.12 0.42




Source d.f. s.s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 18 16.22 0.90 1.27
Age 2 0.10 0.05 0.07
Deg 2 4.44 2.22 3.15*
Expy 2 2.39 1.19 1.69
Time 1 0.38 0.38 0.54
Expn 2 0.48 0.24 0.34
Fed 1 0.38 0.38 0.55
Mang 1 4.95 4.95 7.02**
Labor 1 0.82 0.82 1.17
Res 3 0.80 0.26 0.38
NAA 1 0.16 0.16 0.22
Error 100 70.55 0.70
"ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY"
(Potency Scales)
Source d.f. s.s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 18 7.36 0.40 0.96
Age 2 1.29 0.64 1.52
Deg 2 1.42 0.71 1.68
Expy 2 1.59 0.79 1.87
Time 1 0.02 0.02 0.05
Expn 2 1.27 0.63 1.50
Fed 1 0.14 0.14 0.34
Mang 1 3.17 3.17 7.48**
Labor 1 0.04 0.04 0.09
Res 3 1.97 0.65 1.55
NAA 1 0.17 0.17 0.40
Error 100 42.45 0.42
*Level of Significance = .05




Source d.f. s.s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 18 40.65 2.25 2.65**
Age 2 2.87 1.43 1.68
Degree 2 1.71 0.85 1.00
Expy 2 0.51 0.25 0.30
Time 1 0.01 0.01 0.02
Expn 2 2.17 1.08 1.27
Fed 1 3.13 3.13 3.66*
Mang 1 2.81 2.81 3.28
Labor 1 0.39 0.39 0.45
Res 3 11.84 3.94 4.61**
NAA 1 0.32 0.32 0.37
Error 100 85.45 0.85
"MANAGEMENT RIGHTS" 
(Potency Scales)
Source d.f. s . s . m. s. F-ratio
Regression 18 14.39 0.79 1.23
Age 2 1.13 0.56 0.87
Degree 2 0.96 0.48 0.74
Expy 2 1.52 0.76 1.17
Time 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
Expn 2 0.05 0.02 0.04
Fed 1 0.58 0.58 0.90
Mang 1 0.44 0.44 0.67
Labor 1 0.06 0.06 0.10
Res 3 3.75 1.25 1.92
NAA 1 0.92 0.92 1.42
Error 100 64.86 0.64
*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance - .01
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"UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL 
DECISION-MAKING AREAS" 
(Evaluative Scales)
Source d.f. s.s. m.s. F-ratio
Regression 18 23.58 1.31 1.62
Age 2 5.76 2.88 3.58*
Degree 2 7.73 3.86 4.81**
Expy 2 0.19 0.09 0.12
Time 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
Expn 2 1.36 0.68 0.84
Fed 1 0.35 0.35 0.44
Mang 1 1.70 1.70 2.12
Labor 1 0.71 0.71 0.88
Res 3 0.25 0.08 0.10
NAA 1 1.06 1.06 1.32
Error 100 80.40 0.80
"UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL 
DECISION-MAKING AREAS" 
(Potency Scales)
Source d.f. s. s. m. s. F-ratio
Regression 18 10.58 0.58 1.85
Age 2 1.97 0.98 3.10*
Degree 2 1.53 0.76 2.42
Expy 2 0.61 0.30 0.97
Time 1 0.50 0.50 1.60
Expn 2 0.87 0.43 1.38
Fed 1 0.38 0.38 1.21
Mang 1 0.07 . 0.07 0.23
Labor 1 0.13 0.13 0.43
Res 3 0.73 0.24 0.77
NAA 1 2.07 2.07 6.54**
Error 100 31.72 0.31
*Level of Significance = .05




Eddie Wilson Bankston, the son of Woodrow W. 
Bankston and Mamie Miller, was born in Albany, Louisiana 
on November 9, 1938. He graduated from Eunice High School, 
Eunice, Louisiana, in June, 1956.
Following military service he enrolled in the 
University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, Louisiana, 
and received his Bachelor of Business Administration Degree 
in August, 1963. He continued his education and received 
the Master of Business Administration Degree from Louisiana 
State University in Baton Rouge in August, 1967.
Since that time he has taught at Louisiana State 
University in New Orleans, the University of Southwestern 
Louisiana, the University of North Dakota, the University 
of Tennessee, and Middle Tennessee State University. He 
is presently a candidate for the Doctor of Business Admin­
istration Degree.




Eddie Wilson Bankston 
Management
An Investigation Into the Nature of Values and Attitudes
of Labor Arbitrators as Influenced by Education, Age,
and Experience . ,Approved:
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